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Abstract 
Password-based logon schemes have many security weaknesses. Smart card and 
biometric based authentication solutions are available as a replacement for standard password-
based schemes for security sensitive environments. However, the cost of deployment and 
maintenance of these systems is quite high. On the other hand, mobile network operators have a 
huge base of deployed smart cards that can be reused to provide authentication in other areas 
significantly reducing costs. 
This master’s thesis presents a study of how the workstation identity management can 
be made more secure and user-friendly by using a mobile phone in the Windows workstation 
logon process. Two workstation logon schemes that utilize both the mobile phone and the UICC 
inside of the phone are proposed as a result of this study. 
The first scheme emulates a smart card reader and a smart card in order to interoperate 
with the Windows smart card framework to provide PKI-based logon. The mobile phone with 
the UICC card emulates a smart card that communicates with the emulated smart card reader 
via protected Bluetooth channel.  
The proposed scheme reuses the Windows smart card infrastructure as much as possible, 
both in terms of software and hardware. Therefore, a seamless integration with Active Directory 
and Window server is achieved. This scheme can work with any authentication scheme used 
with real smart cards.  It can be used not only for the logon but also for all other functions 
typically done with smart cards (e.g. signing of documents, e-mails). 
In the second scheme, the mobile phone with the UICC serves as a token for generating 
OTP values based on a shared secret key and the time parameter. 
In order to design Windows logon architectures based on mobile phones, a study of 
relevant technologies, components, and their security aspects has been conducted. Existing 
phone-based authentication schemes have been thoroughly studied both from the usability and 
from the security points of view. This has been done to understand possible alternatives for 
different aspects of the architectures that were designed. 
The thesis analyzed how new authentication schemes in general and those that work 
with mobile phones in particular could be integrated into the Windows logon system.  A 
conclusion is made that it is impossible to make a generic architecture that would easily support 
all existing and possible future mobile phone authentication schemes for the Windows logon. 
Windows is already a highly customizable environment and can support virtually any 
authentication scheme for the logon, though a considerable amount of modifications may be 
required to implement a particular scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
Identity management is one of important concepts of the modern society. Every person 
has one or several identities. An ordinary person typically has a citizen identity, an 
employee/student identity, an alumni identity, a driver license, and a set of digital identities. 
People constantly need to prove their identity. While in the physical world this usually means 
showing a document that identifies you, in the digital world this process can be much more 
sophisticated. Digital identity attributes such as login, name, etc. can be easily copied, thus to 
prevent the identity theft some secret credentials known only to a person and an authentication 
authority have to be used [1]. 
The identity management is a continuous process that encompasses among other things 
identity lifecycle management, authentication, and access control [4]. In the context of modern 
enterprise information systems, the main purpose of the identity management is to manage 
access to enterprise resources and information assets. Enterprise information systems provide 
variety of services to support business processes, and with development of e-business the 
complexity and functionality of these systems only grows. Thus, it is becoming increasingly 
harder to provide a full protection from unauthorized access. Authentication plays a crucial role, 
since a decision whether to give access to services/resources is identity-based. Therefore, it is 
important to ensure that a fraudster would not be able to steal the identity or impersonate a user 
to a system in some other way. 
1.1 Motivation 
Authentication is done by presenting a proof of identity to the verifier. All authentication 
schemes are based on the combination of the following factors: something you know, 
something you have, and something that you are. The most common authentication scheme 
nowadays is a static password authentication (one factor authentication). Password 
authentication schemes have been used for a very long time. These schemes are easy to use, and 
people are used to them. However, from a security point of view these schemes have many 
weaknesses. The computational power of modern computers is constantly increasing, thus it is 
possible to launch a brute force extensive search attack on password-based authentication 
schemes if passwords are weak. Besides, new vulnerabilities that dramatically decrease the 
theoretical security level of cryptographic protocols are constantly found, thus allowing 
attackers to launch much more efficient attacks than the extensive search. 
 In a properly designed cryptographic scheme, the use of longer keys that have higher 
entropy provides a higher security level. Therefore, it might seem that by using strong, 
randomly generated passwords with adequate length that consist of a combination of letters, 
numbers, and special symbols we can solve this problem. However, such passwords are difficult 
to remember for humans. That is why people tend to choose passwords that can be 
compromised with a simple dictionary attack. Furthermore, the number of user-name/password 
systems that the user has to use can be quite big. Therefore, it can be difficult to remember all 
credentials. Consequently, some users either reuse passwords or write them down. It is also 
important to note that by using strict administrative measures one may not reach the aim of 
strengthening security of a system. A too strict password policy (hard to remember passwords, 
frequent change, etc.) instead of strengthening the overall security of the system can actually 
weaken it, since users can end up writing down passwords. The usage of default passwords and 
careless users, which reveal their passwords either accidentally or as a result of social 
engineering attacks, can further reduce the security level of the system. 
For some systems, the password-based authentication may be sufficient, but systems 
that process sensitive data require stronger authentication schemes. Biometric, smart card 
based, or one-time password based authentication schemes are considered to be much stronger 
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than the ordinary user-name/password authentication scheme, though the cost of deployment 
and maintenance makes these systems less common. 
Security is a cornerstone in a smart card development. A combination of logical and 
physical security mechanisms, which form a unified protection system, ensures a high level of 
security. The ability to store information (e.g. identity information) and execute cryptographic 
protocols in a secure manner resulted in a great success for smart cards in security sensitive 
areas. Mobile network operators have already deployed smart cards to authenticate subscribers, 
thus this infrastructure can be reused to provide authentication in other spheres.  
An authentication solution that uses a mobile phone with a UICC card as a security 
token can provide strong two-factor authentication based on the possession of the UICC card 
and on the authentication of the card owner to the card.  This authentication solution provides 
much stronger level of security than the user-name/password authentication and at the same 
time reduces operational costs [99]. One of the most common areas of password authentication 
schemes usage is workstation/domain logon. Authentication that utilizes mobile phones can be 
a cost-effective and secure solution for the workstation logon in Windows domains. 
1.2  Problem definition 
The problem statement of this master’s thesis is: “How can the workstation identity 
management be made more secure and user-friendly by using a mobile phone in the Windows 
workstation logon process?” 
The master’s thesis also investigates how new secure authentication technologies that 
utilize mobile phones as security elements can be integrated into the Windows environment. It 
analyses the complexity of integrating new authentication solutions into Windows and describes 
what Windows components need to be customized/modified in order to incorporate a new 
authentication method into the logon procedure. 
1.3  Objectives 
The main objective of the master’s thesis is to develop a solution for the Windows 
workstation logon that would provide stronger security than the ordinary password scheme by 
using abilities of the phone itself and the card inside. The solution should not just concentrate 
on some particular phone. It should be compatible with as many phones as possible.  
The second objective is to study how new authentication schemes that work with mobile 
phones can be integrated into the Windows logon system. 
The task involves a study of related technologies and components and their security 
aspects. The study of identity and access management technologies, smart card related 
technologies, UMTS systems, and Bluetooth technology is conducted. 
Existing mobile phone based authentication schemes are thoroughly studied both from 
the usability and from the security points of view. This is done to understand possible 
alternatives for different aspects of the architecture that is to be designed. 
The next step is to design and implement the proposed solution. Then goes a discussion 
of the solution’s security aspects and a comparison of the proposed solution with the strongest 
existing mobile phone based authentication schemes in terms of security, usability, and 
complexity of integration into Windows. 
1.4 Related work 
A lot of research concerning various aspects of the mobile phone based authentication 
has been done and several solutions have been proposed [99, 100, 103]. Most of these solutions 
are mobile network operator dependent. It means that the operator provides identity 
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management services. 
The Mobile-OTP is a free one-time password authentication solution that works as a 
Java-based soft token system [111]. It means that a mobile phone with a Java MIDlet acts as a 
token that generates one-time passwords, and the UICC card capabilities are not used at all. 
This system was designed to be used for authentication of users at routers, firewalls, web 
servers, access points, and UNIX machines.  
The ActivIdentity Corporation in April 2010 introduced a new solution to provision 
public key infrastructure (PKI) onto BlackBerry smart phones using a secure microSD card 
[112]. Their solution allows signing emails and provides a two-factor authentication for web 
portals. This solution is more secure than the previous one, but still not as strong as the one 
based on smart cards. Besides, it does not work with the Windows workstation logon. 
Mobile phone based authentication schemes have been used in online banking and e-
commerce for several years. In May 2010 EZMCOM launched MSIGN - Mobile PKI Platform 
[113]. It offers two-channel, two-factor authentication based on PKI. It utilizes an over-the-air 
(OTA) channel and a Java software client on the phone. This platform provides secure online 
banking, mobile payments, and e-commerce. Although this system provides strong two-factor 
authentication based on PKI enabled mobile phones, in its current form it cannot be used for the 
workstation logon. 
To my knowledge, there is no available system or a published work that deals with 
Windows workstation logon schemes based on a mobile phone and a smart card inside of it. 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter provides a study of relevant 
technologies. It contains an overview of what is identity management and a study of identity 
management in enterprises and UMTS systems. The chapter continues with an in-depth analysis 
of smart security and Bluetooth technology and security. 
The third chapter “Analysis” investigates authentication and authorization in Windows. 
The emphasis on the logon procedure and the Windows smart card architecture is made. Then 
an evaluation of Windows extendibility in relation to custom authentication mechanisms is 
conducted. The chapter ends with a description and a thorough analysis of existing mobile 
phone based authentication schemes. 
The fourth chapter contains two proposed logon architectures. The first one utilizes PKI 
and a Bluetooth smart card reader driver. The second one is a typical OTP scheme. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to discussions and future work. Conclusions are made in chapter 
six. The document also has two appendixes that contain the source code for the proposed 
solutions. 
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2. Background and Overview 
This chapter provides a study of relevant technologies. It is crucial for understanding of 
the thesis, since in this chapter many security aspects of the involved technologies are 
discussed. 
2.1  Identity and identity management 
This subchapter contains an overview of what is identity management and a study of 
identity management in enterprises and UMTS systems. 
2.1.1 Notion of identity and identity management 
Identity is an intuitively understood notion that is related to existence of objects, their 
properties and distinct characteristics [1]. It is used to distinguish objects. The classical view of 
identity is an equivalence relation defined as “everything has to itself and to nothing else” that 
complies with the Leibniz’s Law [2]. The Leibniz Law that can be expressed as: “No two 
objects have exactly the same properties” consist of two principles [1]: 
 If two objects are identical, then they must have the same properties 
 If two objects have all the same properties, they are identical 
Real-world objects have infinite number properties. Therefore, the second principle should be 
limited to a finite set of properties that can uniquely characterize an object among a specific 
group of objects in order to be used in the real life. This set of properties that uniquely identifies 
an object can be seen as an identity. 
An identity is a set of attributes and identifiers associated with an entity [1] by which an 
entity is uniquely recognizable [3]. The following three definitions describe the actual purpose 
of the identity concept: 
 Identification – is a process of determining the identity of an entity based on the 
identifier presented by the entity; 
 Authentication – a process of verifying the identity of an entity [3]; 
 Authorization – the process of specifying access rights to resources of a system. 
However, in the digital world it is relatively simple to make an exact copy of all 
attributes and identifiers. Therefore, identities used in digital world contain a secret attribute 
known only to the owner of the identity and, possibly, to an entity that performs authentication 
(in case of shared secret key authentication). 
Identity management 
The diversity of information systems and applications that a typical user has to work 
with is quite big nowadays. If these systems/applications are for the personal use, then it i s 
responsibility of the user to manage all his/her identities among all these systems, which are 
quite often completely unrelated an independent from each other. Some users experience 
difficulties managing their identities because of the number of the involved systems. In 
managed environments with a big number of users, this problem is much more serious. The 
managing authority should ensure that all users receive access to data and applications that they 
are supposed to and, at the same time, it should ensure that access is not provided to any other 
subjects, thus protecting valuable assets. Since most of the access decisions are identity-based, 
identity management plays a fundamental role in the security of a system. 
Identity management (Identity and access management) can be defined as a set of 
“processes, policies and technologies to manage the complete life cycle of user identities across 
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the system and to control the user access to the system resources by associating user rights and 
restrictions” [4]. A comprehensive identity management system includes the following 
functions [4]: 
 Identification: defining user identity 
 Authentication: verification of user identities 
 Authorization: only authorized users can access protected resources 
 Single Sign-on: allows a user to sign once in the system and have access to all 
required resources automatically without the need to provide credentials 
repeatedly 
 Administration: managing users and assets. Includes registration, self-service, 
delegated administration, federated provisioning, etc. 
 Auditing: documenting events and system activity 
 
2.1.2 Identity and access management in enterprise systems 
The main purpose of enterprise information systems is to provide a variety of services to 
support business processes. Business objectives are the driving force for the growth of 
functionality provided by IT systems. And with the development of e-business, enterprise IT 
systems get more and more tied to the Internet. However, the complexity and the vast 
functionality of these systems makes it increasingly harder to provide protection from 
unauthorized access to enterprise information assets. Access control management needs to take 
into account threats from outsiders, semi-trusted parties like partners, customers, and insiders. 
The access control system strongly relies on the identity management system to manage access 
to enterprise resources. Identity and access control management (IAM) must keep up with the 
demand of business to have external connections to partners, suppliers, customers, etc. 
Therefore, it is not enough to manage only identities of corporate users; identity management 
goes beyond the borders of an enterprise. 
Situation is further complicated by the fact that many organizations have many 
heterogeneous IT platforms, each with its own identity database. The centralization of identity 
management simplifies management tasks, reduces management costs, and mitigates the risk 
that something will not be taken into account during data flows planning and privileges setup 
[5].  
Moreover, IAM systems must comply with specific legislation if companies want to 
provide specific services like processing credit card payments [5]. 
Centralized identity and access control management 
A centralized identity and access control management approach provides a single 
interface to manage identities and access controls for many heterogeneous systems with 
different repositories within an enterprise. A directory service forms a foundation of the identity 
and access management system because it stores information about a state of enterprise 
systems. This state information includes identities, account-related information (ex. passwords), 
policies, groups, roles, workflows, etc. A directory is a special type of database that is optimized 
for the read operation, while databases are optimized for the write/modify operation [9]. 
Besides, directories are mainly accessed via the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) 
and databases use the Structured Query Language (SQL) for this purpose [9]. If there is only 
one server that stores all data in one location, then the directory is centralized. The directory can 
also be distributed, when there is more than one server and information is either replicated 
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between servers, so that all have the same data, or it is dived between servers so that each holds 
only some part of data.  
Many different repositories make it difficult to manage identities and access control 
rules, and this approach is also prone to mistakes that can lead to flaws in security. 
Synchronization and consolidation of data helps to reduce management costs and makes the 
whole system more manageable. There are many different ways in which an integrated 
enterprise directory service can be provided. It can be a single directory, a meta directory, and a 
virtual directory [5]. 
Single directory: as a name implies there is only one directory that is a single source of 
identity information for the whole system. A single directory simplifies management tasks 
compared to a bunch of different repositories; however, some applications might have to be 
modified to be able to work with a single directory [5]. Uniqueness is not in physical terms but 
in logical. A single directory can be distributed among several servers (each holding the same 
data) in order not to create a single point of failure and to distribute the load. Legal, political or 
security issues may make a barrier preventing creation of a single directory [10]. In this case, 
IAM provides a single interface to manage all these systems. 
Meta directory: information from all various repositories is copied into a single 
directory with a unified namespace. Bidirectional synchronization mechanism controls  
synchronization between a meta directory and satellite/original repositories when data change 
occurs [10]. With this approach, there is no need to modify applications that worked with 
particular repositories since these repositories remain in the system [5]. 
Virtual directory: virtual directory serves as an abstraction layer between various 
repositories and applications by providing a single logical directory that gathers information 
from all repositories in real-time. A logical presentation of data can be customized for each 
application. From the same input data, different application-specific views of data, optimized 
for application needs, are derived [26]. There is no central physical directory that contains a 
copy of all data like in the meta directory approach. 
IAM main functions: 
 Managing users and accounts: includes creating, editing, deactivating, and deleting 
users, setting/changing user passwords, etc. 
 Policy- and workflow-based management: Policies and workflows help automate 
management process. Policies that can be used in an enterprise include the 
following: account provisioning, password, authentication policy, etc. A workflow is 
a predefined sequence of automated processes that automates some time-consuming 
actions like gathering approvals. Workflows enforce consistency (the sequence and 
the set of involved actions is constant) and completeness (do not start some action 
until all previous are finished successfully). Request for approvals always take the 
same predetermined path and are automatically delivered to a person in charge. 
 Privileges and Access control management: setting permissions so that only those 
entities that have permission can access a resource. The common models for access 
control are: the Discretionary Access Control (DAC), the Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC), and the Role-based access control model. 
 Enterprise single sign-on: Single sign-on is a mechanism that enables a user to 
authenticate once to a system and reuse this authentication for many enterprise 
applications during current session. There is no need to have different accounts for 
different service providers and remember corresponding passwords. A user gets 
enterprise-wide access to data.  
 Strong authentication: Strong authentication solutions imply the usage of a two 
factor authentication.  Technologies such as smartcards and biometrics can be used 
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to achieve two-factor authentication. According to [10], SIM-based strong 
authentication that utilizes mobile phones can be quite cost-efficient compared to 
other two-factor solutions, and is comparable in price with password-based 
authentication. 
 Monitoring and audit: system events are automatically checked against policies and 
regulations for violations. If the violation is detected, some action is triggered, for 
example account blocking. 
 Federated identity management: user authenticated identity information is 
communicated across security domains to trusted partners that reside in the same 
Circle of trust. It means that a user does not need to authenticate when he wants to 
access resources of a collaborating company. 
Identity and access manager architecture: 
Figure 2.1.2.1: Identity and access manager architecture 
It is possible to use a standard administration and management toolkit for a single 
directory without using IAM software. However, then all functions that are automated in an 
IAM suite should be done manually. IAM suites have a benefit that they can define policies that 
automatically create user accounts, mail boxes, and group memberships in real-time. Besides, it 
is not always possible to create a single directory. 
Centralized authentication and trust 
At the early stages of the development of authentication solutions a decentralized 
autonomous approach was used. Every station in a system performed authentication and 
authorization autonomously by maintaining its own users file/users database, and the access to 
services/resources provided by that station was based on that file. In order to allow users from 
one station to use services provided by some server, administrator had to add entries about those 
users to the users file of the server. A user had to have account on every station which 
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services/resources he used. This management approach had severe scalability issues. 
Remembering different passwords for different accounts, in case different passwords were used, 
or synchronizing password changes between many accounts, in case one password was used for 
many accounts - these both approaches introduced a lot of management and security problems. 
All identity and access control management procedures required enormous amount of work and 
were prone to errors. 
The solution was to use a trusted third-party authentication approach. The third-party 
authentication authority maintains a centralized repository with identities and account-related 
information. Each user has only one account which is maintained by a third-party authority. The 
authentication is solely done by the trusted third-party and all other systems trust it. To be 
trustworthy the third-party should be highly secure, since the compromise of the third-party 
would lead to the compromise of a whole system. Besides, a third-party authority is a single 
point of failure, if it crashes the whole system will be inaccessible. There are two third-party 
authentication based schemas [12]: 
 Implicit authentication schema: an authenticating entity (ex. Service provider) does 
not explicitly request authentication service from a centralized authentication 
authority. The authentication is cryptographically deduced from the encrypted 
message given by the third-party to the entity that is being authenticated. For 
example, Kerberos v5 protocol uses this approach. 
 Explicit authentication schema: an authenticating entity explicitly requests third-
party to make authentication. 
There are many technologies that provide authentication and access control, but in 
general preferred are Kerberos security service and LDAP directories [13]. Kerberos primary 
provides authentication, however it can also provide some rudimentary authorization services. 
On the other hand, LDAP directories are mainly used for storing and managing authorization 
data, but they can also offer some authentication services [13]. That is why these technologies 
can be used separately or they can be integrated in one system. 
Kerberos protocol 
Kerberos is a protocol that deploys implicit authentication schema. Kerberos version 5, 
defined in RFC 4120, is the current version of the protocol. Kerberos performs mutual secure 
authentication in an unsecure network, though it does not provide accounting and can offer only 
very basic authorization [14]. Kerberos uses secret key cryptography to provide secure 
authentication service. There are three types of entities in the Kerberos architecture: 
 Clients: want to use services provided by service providers 
 Service providers: provide services for clients 
 Kerberos servers: manage Kerberos authentication. They are called Key Distribution 
Centers (KDC). KDC shares a secret key with every principal (a client or a service 
provider) in a network. Clients and service providers trust KDC. KDC consist of 
three different elements: Authentication server that answers client authentication 
requests, Ticket granting server that issues Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets to 
clients, and a database that stores identities, secret keys, policies, etc. 
Security in Kerberos schema is based on tickets and corresponding authenticators. A 
ticket is an encrypted message containing a client name, session key, and ticket’s lifetime. The 
ticket is encrypted with a secret key shared by a server and KDC. The authenticator is an 
encrypted client’s name, client’s realm, timestamp. The authenticator is encrypted with the 
session key that is in the corresponding ticket. By providing the ticket and the authenticator to a 
server, a client can authenticate. 
KDC is trusted by all principals in a realm - an authentication domain with some 
administrative boundaries. A realm is managed by only one KDC (KDC can be distributed 
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between several servers to share the load, but logically it is one). Each realm has its own KDC 
database. The principal identity consists of the Name and the Realm parts. 
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Figure 2.1.2.2: Kerberos authentication model 
The whole Kerberos authentication procedure consists of three distinct exchanges: 
 The Client – Authentication server exchange: The Client authenticates the KDC 
and obtains Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) that will be used to obtain credentials for 
authentication to a Service provider. The Authentication server can authenticate the 
client before issuing the TGT (pre-authentication), or wait until Client – Ticket 
granting server exchange [13]. From the security point of view it is better to make 
pre-authentication, because this way the protection is provided against attacks on the 
principal’s secret key [11], used by KDC to encrypt the response. 
 The Client - Ticket granting server exchange: the Server authenticates the Client 
(this authentication happens in any case) and grants a Ticket Granting Service (TGS) 
to a Service provider specified in the request by the client. TGS will be used in the 
Client – Service provider authentication. 
 The Client – Service provider authentication exchange: The Client sends a 
request to the Service provider which typically contains authentication information 
and initial request [11]. The Client always authenticates to the Service provider, but 
the mutual authentication must be requested by the Client explicitly [11].  The TGS 
and the authenticator which are in the Client’s request enable the Service provider to 
authenticate the Client and derive shared session key which can be used to protect 
further communication with the client [11]. If the Client requests mutual 
authentication, then the Service provider’s reply contains authentication information 
that enables the Client to authenticate the Service provider.  
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The main services provided by Kerberos are: 
 mutual Client –Server authentication: a client is able to authenticate  both KDC and 
various Service providers, so a  malicious server won’t be able to deceive a client 
and obtain confidential information. 
 centralized management of authentication information: Kerberos utilizes centralized 
database to store identity and account information 
 delegation: a principal may need to allow a service provider to perform operations 
on its behalf, for example a client can delegate rights to a printing server to access 
client’s files on a file server to print them out [11].  A principal can ask KDC for a 
new TGT with a different network address, so that a service with that network 
address can act on behalf of the principal. The principal needs to transmit the new 
TGT and the corresponding session key to the service provider to enable delegation.  
 single sign–on: Kerberos supports single sign-on by caching tickets and 
corresponding session keys. So the next time the authentication is needed, a user 
doesn’t need to type in the password, cached credentials are used on user’s behalf.  
 cross-realm authentication: a client in one realm can authenticate to a service 
provider from another realm. To establish an inter-realm communication the service 
provider’s KDC should be registered as a principal in the client’s KDC. Then the 
client asks its KDC for a ticket to the service provider’s KDC, presents this ticket to 
the service provider’s KDC and asks it for a ticket to the service provider. It is 
possible to traverse several realms to authenticate to the remote service provider. 
Inter-realm communication can be organized hierarchically. This way the 
authentication path through multiple realms can be easily created [11]. 
 multi-factor authentication: the traditional Kerberos authentication is based on the 
secret keys (for a user the secret key is derived from a password).  However, the 
public key cryptography for initial client – KDC authentication (PKINIT defined in 
RFC 4556) can also be used. Thus, it is possible to use smart cards and other 
cryptographic tokens when authenticating via Kerberos [17]. PKINIT requires the 
usage of trusted by KDC and its principals Certification Authority. It is also possible 
to use One-Time Password mechanism or biometric scanners for initial 
authentication. 
There are several different implementations of the Kerberos Protocol: MIT version, 
Heimdal version, Windows Active Directory version, etc [15]. Active Directory not simply 
utilizes Kerberos as its default authentication protocol leaving NTLM for compatibility [7], but 
tightly integrates it in its framework, and that results in some issues in environments with 
Windows and non-windows systems [17].  
Explicit authentication schema 
The authentication is entrusted to a third-party that has all identity information. The 
typical authentication procedure is the following: 
 a client contacts an application server and passes its credentials (identity and 
password) to the application server 
 the application server contacts the trusted third-party server to perform the  
authentication  
The exchanges between the client and the application server and between the application 
server and the third party should be cryptographically protected.  
Technologies like Network Information Service (NIS), NIS+, and directory services 
with Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) interface are used to provide centralized 
third-party directory service for storing identities and account-related information.  Typically 
NIS is used to centralize the storage of /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/group, etc. files from all 
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stations in the unix-based domain, and then this information can be accessed by clients [6]. The 
changes made in the centralized directory are propagated to all source stations.  The NIS is an 
easy to manage protocol from administration point of view, but it does not provide security 
mechanisms: it does not provide authentication and authorization for directory access, and all 
communication is unencrypted [14].  
Both NIS and NIS+ are Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) based protocols. NIS+ is a 
successor of the NIS protocol. In addition to providing hierarchical namespace, NIS+ offers a 
stronger security. However, NIS and NIS+ are legacy technologies, and it is recommended to 
migrate to LDAP [16]. 
Authentication against LDAP server 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, defined in RFC 4511, is a protocol for accessing 
directory services that comply with X.500 standard. There are many directory servers that 
provide LDAP support: Active Directory, Novell eDirectory, Sun Java System Directory Server, 
IBM Tivoli Directory Server, OpenLDAP, etc. 
LDAP is a client-server paradigm protocol that runs directly on top of TCP. It is 
recommended that the servers listen on port 389 for incoming requests. A client transmits a 
request to a server to perform some operation in the directory. The server performs the 
operation and returns a response. Some of the operations used in LDAP are the following: bind, 
unbind, search, modify, add, delete, compare, startTLS. 
The Bind operation is equivalent to authentication. The Bind request specifies the 
authentication identity. The Bind operation utilizes several authentication methods: simple 
authentication method and SASL authentication method [25]. The simple authentication method 
is further divided into: anonymous authentication, unauthenticated authentication, and 
name/password authentication. In the name/password authentication the client sends both the 
name and the password to the server for validation. This authentication method should only be 
used in environments where confidentiality protection is provided [25].  Client can request TLS 
establishment for the LDAP session by sending request with StartTLS operation. TLS provides 
confidentiality and integrity protection for LDAP session, so it is possible to perform a simple 
name/password authentication in a secure manner. 
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL), defined in RFC 4422, is a 
framework that enables usage of various security mechanisms in protocols. SASL provides the 
abstraction layer that allows any protocol to utilize any mechanism. By providing SASL 
authentication method, LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [25]. 
The Bind response message is just an indication of a success/failure of the 
authentication request. 
LDAP became one of the major elements in enterprise identity and access control 
systems [15]. It provides centralized storage for identity and account-related information and 
can be used to authenticate principals. The authentication procedure starts with client sending 
its identity and password to the application server over the protected channel. For example, 
protection can be provided with TLS/SSL. If the LDAP server is configured so that principals 
need to authenticate to it, then the application server sends the Bind request to the LDAP server 
using credentials of the client. If this authentication succeeds (the LDAP server sends Bind 
response message with success status), then the application server considers the client to be 
authenticated. The other possibility is for the application server to simply retrieve the client’s 
identity and password from the directory and compare with those received from the client [18]. 
In this case the application server should authenticate to the LDAP server prior to the 
information retrieval, and, besides, the application server should be authorized by the LDAP 
server to perform those actions. 
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Enterprise Single sign-on 
The Single sign-on (SSO) is a mechanism that enables a user to authenticate once to a 
system and reuse this authentication during the current session. Technologies that can be used to 
provide single sign-on can be divided into three classes [8]: ticket–based, cookie-based, and 
PKI-based. 
In Ticket-based SSO a user first authenticates to the authentication service and receives 
cryptographic ticket, and then this ticket is used to authenticate to service providers. Kerberos is 
a typical ticket-based SSO system. 
 In Web-based environments Enterprise SSO can be achieved via cryptographically 
protected HTTP cookies. Sun OpenSSO Enterprise 8.0 uses this approach to provide SSO 
solution. The SSO process used by OpenSSO consists of the following steps [22]: 
1. A user sends HTTP request to a service provider. This request is intercepted by the 
policy engine that protects the resource. After examining request and finding no HTTP 
cookie, the policy engine redirects the user to another URL for authentication. 
2. The browser follows the redirect URL and issues the new HTTP request to OpenSSO 
Enterprise authentication service. The authentication service by using one of its 
authentication modules, for example LDAP authentication as described in the previous 
paragraph, validates user’s credentials. The HTTP response containing cookie that 
carries encrypted session token is sent to the client. The HTTP response also contains 
redirect to the original location. 
3. The browser follows the redirect and sends HTTP request to the service provider one 
more time. However, this time the request contains cookie with the session token. The 
policy engine intercepts request and checks the session token. The check is made by 
contacting OpenSSO Enterprise service. OpenSSO Enterprise decrypts the token and 
checks whether the session data associated with the session token exists. The policy 
engine receives a response stating whether the token is valid. After the session token 
validation, the policy agent decides if the user should be granted access. 
4. When the next time the user contacts some other service provider, the cookie with the 
session token is included in the request. So, the policy engine that intercepts the request 
needs only to validate the token. The second authentication procedure is not required 
from a user. 
 
Public key –based SSO requires the usage of public key infrastructure. The trusted third 
party certification authority is responsible for checking user’s credentials and issuing 
certificates. The certificate and the user’s private key can be stored on a user’s station, on a 
smart card, or on some cryptographic token [19]. The authentication of the user is made by the 
service provider itself, the certification authority checks identity of the user only when issuing 
certificate. The PKI infrastructure also provides nonrepudation service, which is quite important 
for business [8]. 
Identity federation 
The business-to–business communication nowadays is characterized by extensive use of 
internet technologies. Business processes require having external connections with partners, 
suppliers, contractors, clients, etc. However, creating and managing accounts for external users 
locally is not an efficient solution from management, security, and operational cost point of 
view [20]. Identity federation is a concept that enables inter-organization identity sharing and 
management, and secure external access to a defined set of company’s resources.  
Identity federation relies on the trust relationship between collaborating organizations. It 
means that one organization trusts in authentication that was made by another organization for 
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some user. The trust relationship makes Single Sign-On service for cooperating organizations 
possible. An Identity provider is an organization that is responsible for maintaining and 
managing end users identity information. A service provider is an entity that provides some 
services. A circle of trust consists of at least one identity provider and a group of service 
providers that trust this identity provider. Many organizations have a role of service provider 
and identity provider at the same time [21], but for some companies it can be beneficial to 
outsource identity management to an identity provider. 
Federation enables seamless interaction between organizations with completely 
different, independent environments. Collaborating organizations neither need to have similar 
security systems nor to have detailed knowledge of systems used by a partner [10]. There are 
several frameworks that define federated identity management: Liberty Alliance Identity 
Federation Framework (ID-FF), Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) framework, 
Web Services Federation (WS-Federation). SAML v2.0 should be considered as a preferred 
solution [22] since Liberty ID-FF and SAML v1.x were contributed to OASIS consortium and 
formed the foundation of SAML v.2.0, and WS-Federation is an alternative solution for 
interaction with Active Directory Federation Services [22]. 
SAML [23] is an XML-based framework for exchanging identity, corresponding 
attributes, and authentication information between collaborating organizations.  This exchanged 
information is expressed in the form of SAML assertions. Assertion contains a set of statements 
about a principal (user, computer, company, etc.). The SAML assertion can contain the 
following types of statements: 
 authentication statements: created by the party that successfully authenticated a user; 
describe authentication mechanism, time of authentication, etc. 
 attribute statements: contain specific principal’s attributes (e-mail, tel.number) 
 authorization decision statements: describe authorized actions 
SAML assertions are transmitted in SAML protocol messages (both assertions and 
protocol messages are XML documents). And SAML bindings describe how protocol messages 
are carried by underlying transport protocols. SAML defines HTTP-based and SOAP-based 
bindings. SAML protocol does not provide security protection for message exchange [24]. It 
relies on other protocols like TLS/SSL or IPSec to provide confidentiality and integrity 
protection. Security can also be ensured by usage of XML encryption and digital signatures. 
The main use cases for SAML are: Single Sign-on and Federated identity. A typical SSO 
scenario is when a client by using a browser application sends request to a service provider. The 
service provider redirects the user to the identity provider for authentication. After 
authentication, the identity provider issues assertion, which is used by the service provider to 
check whether the user should be granted access to resource. Any subsequent requests to other 
service providers in the same circle of trust do not require the user to go through authentication 
procedure one more time. 
Identity federation model depends on many factors. For example, some factors that 
influence identity federation are: whether users have existing local identities, whether identity 
attributes about users should be exchanged, whether identity federation should be based on 
temporal identifiers that are destroyed after session termination, etc.  
Some of the use cases described by SAML for identity federation [23]: 
 Federation via Out-of-Band Account Linking: identity federation is established without 
usage of SAML protocol. For example, it could be done via database synchronization. 
 Federation via Persistent Pseudonym Identifiers: permanent SAML pseudonym 
identifier is used to dynamically establish identity federation during web SSO exchange 
14 
 
 Federation via Transient Pseudonym Identifiers: A temporary identifier is used to 
temporary federate identity till the user’s web session termination. The benefit of this 
approach is that an organization does not need to manage local accounts for users from a 
collaborating organization. 
 Federation Termination: removal of an existing federation. 
Identity federation enables organizations to provide access to external users from 
collaborating organizations without the need to manage these accounts locally, thus reducing 
administrative costs, simplifying identity management, and enhancing security. Besides, it 
provides benefits for external users presenting web single sign-on service. And SAML is 
standard solution that offers both identity federation and single sign-on. 
Identity and access management is crucial for business environments. It is a mechanism 
that protects enterprise resources from unauthorized access initiated by inside as well as 
external users. Business objectives dictate the intense usage of internet-based applications and 
demand limited, secure access to enterprise resources for external users from collaborating 
organizations like partners, contractors, clients, etc. The variety end complexity of systems used 
by business complicates the identity and access management tasks. Centralized storages for 
identity and account-related information as well as centralized authentication make things more 
manageable. However, it is not always possible to have a single directory because of 
administrative, security or some other issues. That is why many identity and access 
management suites are being developed to provide centralized interface for management 
purposes. 
 
2.1.3  Identity and access management in UMTS systems 
The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is a 3
rd
 generation 3GPP 
mobile network technology that evolved from the GSM. It introduced enhanced security, a 
completely new radio access network that allowed much greater speeds then in GSM, IP as a 
transport protocol between network elements over the whole system (3GPP Release 5), etc. 
[27]. 
The UMTS network has two parts: the Radio Access Network (RAN) and the Core 
Network (CN). The CN in turn consists of the following domains [27]: the Packet Switched 
(PS) domain, the Circuit Switched (CS) domain, the Broadcast (BC) domain, and the IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS).  
The User Equipment (UE) consists of the mobile phone and the Universal Integrated 
Circuit Card (UICC) that contains Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application. 
The UICC may also contain another application called IP multimedia Services Identity Module 
(ISIM) that is required for services in the IMS. The UE has radio connections with Base stations 
(BS) that are the part of RAN. The primary task of BSs is to deal with radio signal 
receiving/transmitting [27].  Base stations (also called Node Bs) are connected to the Radio 
Network Controller (RNC) that implements most of the controlling logic of RAN. 
Main components of the PS domain of the core network are the Serving GPRS Support 
Node (SGSN) and the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). The SGSN is responsible for 
packet routing and transfer, it also maintains data needed to perform these functions [27]: 
temporary identities, location information, IP addresses, etc. The GGSN takes care of 
interconnecting with external IP networks. 
The CS domain consists of the Mobile service Switching Centre (MSC) with the Visitor 
Location Register (VLR), which is a temporary database of the subscribers that are currently in 
the location area controlled by the MSC, and the Gateway MSC (GMSC). The main function of 
the MSC is a call control and switching of calls. The GMSC is responsible for interconnection 
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with telephone networks. 
The Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is a main storage for subscriber data and identifiers. 
Among other functions, HSS is responsible for [27]: 
 storing of addressing information for mobility management; 
 security information generation and access authorization; 
 call/session establishment support. 
Equipment Identity Register (EIR) is another database that contains information about 
user equipment and its status (e.g. list of stolen phones). 
The following diagram depicts UMTS architecture. 
Figure 2.1.3.1: UMTS architecture 
UMTS identifiers 
UMTS has many different identifiers. Some are to ensure uniqueness of the subscriber 
identity, other are for security purposes. 
The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [28] is a globally unique identifier 
for a subscriber. Consists of the Mobile Country Code (MCC), the Mobile Network Code 
(MNC), and the Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (MSIN) that is unique within the mobile 
operator’s network. It plays a role of a search key in HLR, VLR, AuC and SGSN [27]. IMSI is 
also stored within USIM application in the UICC. 
The Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) and P-TMSI – are used to protect 
user confidentiality from passive eavesdroppers in CS domain and PS domain respectively.  
Subscriber identification in UMTS networks is in most cases performed by using these 
temporary identifiers instead of IMSI [29]. 
The Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number (MSISDN) is a globally unique identifier that 
acts as a telephone number. It is used for routing calls to the phone [30]. The MSISDN is stored 
in the HSS. 
The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) is a globally unique number that 
identifies the mobile phone. The UE provides this number to the network (when requested) and 
the network verifies the status of the mobile phone by checking whether it is not blacklisted in 
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the EIR [27]. 
The IP Multimedia Private Identity (IMPI) is used by the IMS to identify subscribers. 
This identifier is stored within the ISIM application and in the HSS [29]. 
The IMS Public Identity (IMPU) – an identifier used by the IMS for addressing 
purposes [27]. IMPI is not intended for this [29]. There should be at least one IMPU associated 
with IMPI. 
UMTS security 
UMTS provides the following security services [29]: 
 Mutual authentication between the serving network and the UE 
 Confidentiality protection of user plane data (no integrity protection) 
 Integrity and replay protection of signaling data 
 Privacy protection 
The UMTS mutual authentication is a secret shared key authentication. The 128-bit master key 
is stored both in USIM and in AuC.  
The general authentication scenario happens when the user enters the area serviced by some 
other operator (serving network). The following steps take place [29]: 
1. The subscriber identifier IMSI, or TMSI, or P-IMSI (P-TMSI) is transferred to the VLR 
or SGSN (in case of packet switched connection); 
2. The serving network sends authentication data request to the AuC in the home network; 
3. The AuC generates authentication vectors (secret key is one of the inputs for generation) 
and sends them to the serving network. Authentication vector consists of {random 
number (RAND), expected response (XRES), encryption key (CK), integrity key(IK), 
and the authentication token (AUTN)}; 
4. The serving network (MSC/VLR or SGSN) sends authentication request to the UE. The 
request contains the AUTN to authenticate the network to the UE and the challenge 
RAND; 
5. These parameters are transferred to the USIM. The USIM authenticates the network and 
generates RES – response to the challenge and temporary keys CK and IK (RAND and 
secret key are used as input); 
6. The UE sends the RES value to the serving network. It is compared to the XRES, and if 
values match, the authentication is passed.  
UMTS encryption is based on the stream cipher that uses block cipher KASUMI to 
produce pseudorandom bit stream [29]. The secret key used in KASUMI is 128-bit long (CK), 
and the input and output blocks are 64 bits. 
UMTS integrity protection also relies on the KASUMI cipher that is used in slightly 
modified form of CBC-MAC mode [29]. The 64-bit output is truncated to produce a 32-bit 
MAC value. Both the encryption and the integrity protection take place between the UE and the 
RNC. 
Privacy protection relies on the TMSI and P-TMSI identifiers that are used instead of 
the permanent identifiers. After initial registration, which utilizes permanent identifiers, the 
system generates temporary identifiers, and after encryption is started these temporary 
identifiers are sent to the UE [29]. These identitifiers are then used for all subsequent 
communications. 
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UMTS is interoperable with GSM. Mobile phones with SIM cards can be used in UMTS 
(under the assumption that these mobile phone support UMTS RAN technology) and mobile 
phones with USIM can be used in GSM. When the UMTS capable mobile phone with UICC 
card that contains USIM applet is used in the GSM network we have 2G encryption and 
authentication [29].  When the UMTS capable mobile phone with UICC card that contains 
USIM applet is used in a 3G network with GSM base stations, we have 2G encryption but 3G 
authentication [29]. This means that interoperability leads to the decrease in the security 
strength. The protection is maximal only in the pure 3G scenario without any interoperation. 
 
 
2.2 Smart card technology 
Smart card technology is crucial for modern information systems. The deployment of 
smartcards is enormous because of the widespread usage of smart cards in mobile phone 
networks, international payment systems like MasterCard and Visa, transport and ticketing 
systems. Besides, smart cards are widely utilized in identification and access-control systems. 
The reason of this success lies in the security services provided by smart cards. 
2.2.1 Smart card definition and types 
A smart card can be defined as a card that has a size of a credit card and contains 
embedded integrated circuits. Thus we are not taking into account magnetic stripe cards that can 
be used only for information storing. Magnetic stripe cards do not provide sufficient level of 
security and can be easily forged [31].  
There are several classes of smart cards with different functionality and purpose: 
Memory chip card: This type of cards acts as storage for information. They generally 
have no on-board processing facilities. Memory chip card provides almost no security gains 
compared to the magnetic stripe card [31, 32]. Although the memory chip card can contain one-
time-programmable memory that is written once and cannot be rewritten later [33], in contrast 
to the magnetic stripe card, it is still easy to read the stored value and produce the copy of the 
card [31, 33].  
More sophisticated memory cards are wired logic-integrated smart cards that in addition 
to write/erase protection restrict read access [35]. They have few fixed extra functionalities and 
the available small command set can be changed only by redesigning the chip [32]. Although 
arithmetic logic unit is very limited, it is able perform simple cryptographic operations for 
authentication and data encryption. For example, MIFARE classic provides authentication of 
the reader based on the stored keys with encryption of all subsequent memory operations [34]. 
Microprocessor chip cards: This type of smart cards contains a microprocessor, an 
operating system, several types of memory, and I/O circuits. Optionally smart cards can also 
contain a crypto coprocessor to accelerate execution of cryptographic operations. Smart cards 
contain the following memory types: Read Only Memory (ROM), Random Access Memory 
(RAM), and Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM). ROM 
contains data that is stored there during the manufacture process and that cannot be modified, it 
can only be read during card operation. The operating system of a smart card is stored in ROM. 
RAM is a volatile type of memory. It is used as a dynamic data storage that loses its content on 
power shutdown. EEPROM is a non-volatile memory, thus data is saved when power is 
removed. EEPROM is used as a general storage for data and application program codes. One of 
the major drawbacks of EEPROM memory is its limited number of write cycles, although it can 
be read unlimited amount of times. Other memory types like flash memory with shorter write 
access time and longer lifetime compared to EEPROM are slowly gaining popularity in smart 
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cards [31]. 
The rest of the overview is primary devoted to the microprocessor chip cards. 
Smart cards have two distinct chip card interfaces: contact and contactless. Contact and 
contactless smart cards are standardized in ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443 standards 
respectively. The main difference between these two interfaces is that a contactless reader 
produces energizing radio frequency field for energy transfer to the contactless smart card via 
air, and the modulation of this field enables transfer of data. Therefore, contactless smart cards 
also have an embedded antenna. There are also dual-interface cards that have both contact and 
contactless interfaces. 
The operational frequency for contactless operation defined by ISO/IEC 14443 is 13,56 
MHz. Contactless smart cards are further divided into proximity and vicinity smart cards. 
Proximity smart cards have a limitation that they must be in a close proximity (up to 10 cm) 
from a reader to function properly. ISO/IEC 15693 standard describes vicinity cards. The 
operational range for vicinity cards is up to approximately 1 m [33]. Supported data rates 
according to ISO/IEC 14443 for contactless smart cards are: 106, 212, 424, and 848 Kbit/s [31]. 
Although vicinity cards provide greater operational distance, the data transfer rate is lower than 
for proximity cards and is only 26.48 kbps [31]. 
The wireless interface introduces an additional vector of possible attacks on smart cards 
which include but are not limited to attacks like eavesdropping, denial of service, man in the 
middle. However, according to [35], contact and contactless cards can basically provide the 
same level of security if threats specific to contactless interface are taken into account in the 
security architecture of a smart card. 
2.2.2 Security provided by smart cards 
One of the fundamental functions of a smart card is to provide secure storage for data 
[36]. Thus, a non-modifiable memory plays a significant role in a smart card security, since it 
can be used as storage for system secret keys [33] (typically top keys of the key hierarchy). 
Another approach is instead of storing  the system secret key in ROM, is to compute it based on 
an unique chip serial number that is stored in the ROM [31, 33].The secure microprocessor is a 
heart of the smart card security system. The word “secure” mainly means that microprocessor is 
protected against physical and side-channel attacks. The introduction of microprocessors in 
smart cards occurred primary because of security reasons, since microprocessors made 
cryptographically protected communications possible [35].  Without it a smart card would just 
have features of an ordinary memory chip card. From the security point of view the functions of 
microprocessor include: generation of pseudo-random numbers for crypto protocols, generation 
of temporal keys, encryption/decryption, digital signature generation, performing operating 
system security checks, for example evaluation of whether access to smart card resources 
should be granted, etc. Therefore, besides providing secure storage, smart cards can be used for 
secure execution of cryptographic algorithms [33]. 
Unlike memory chip cards, an access to microprocessor smart card’s resources is 
controlled by an operating system that is run on a microprocessor. Consequently, the logical 
level security is provided by the operating system access control system that grants or denies 
access to smart card resources. Some of the security mechanisms provided by modern smart 
card operating systems are listed below: 
 Access control: the access to smart card resources is based on specific access 
conditions and is allowed only to authorized entities. Access control can be based on 
a state-oriented or a command-oriented access model [33] 
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 Authentication: card reader authentication, user authentication (prior to allowing any 
operations on behalf of the user, the user should be authenticated) , authentication of 
communicating parties  
 Process isolation: a process can’t access resources owned by other processes 
 Atomic transactions: either all of the operations that constitute a transaction are 
performed or none of them  
 Secured communication: smart cards utilize security protocols for communications 
to protect information during transfer.  
 Cryptographic protection: smart cards support usage of various cryptographic 
mechanisms like encryption, hashing, digital signature, random number generation. 
 Key management: the operating system is responsible for secure generation, 
distribution, usage and destruction of cryptographic keys 
 Security monitoring and audit: the system events can be monitored and analyzed on 
the presence of potential security violations 
 Secure data deletion: data after deletion should not be accessible or recoverable 
 Card locking: ability to temporary/permanently disable a specific application or the 
whole card 
However, an attacker can try to obtain data directly from the memory or buses during 
data transfer, avoiding the security checks made by the operating system. Therefore, to mitigate 
this threat smart cards also provide protection against physical attacks.  
Physical attacks on smart cards can be divided into invasive and non-invasive attacks. 
The invasive physical attacks require removal of the microprocessor from a card to get direct 
access to it. This kind of attacks requires sophisticated equipment (ex.: a microscope, laser, 
micromanipulators, focused ion beams) and a lot of technical knowledge [31, 33]. Invasive 
attacks start with an analysis of the microprocessor structure. That is why the first line of 
protection measures is deployed at this stage to complicate the analysis for an attacker. The 
protection measures can be the following: a small size of IC components make it hard to extract 
information [33, 35]; the layout of the chip’s blocks can be random [31], dummy structures on 
the chip that have no meaning to the functions of the chip [33], covering the chip with a metal 
layer hides the layout of the chip [31]. Although hiding the structure of the cheap will make 
analysis harder for an attacker, it should not be considered as an adequate protection against 
physical attacks. The following mechanisms provide stronger protection specifically against 
intrusive attacks:  
 Buried and scrambled chip buses: Buses are buried inside of the chip to prevent 
direct contact. Besides, buses are scrambled to complicate understanding what these 
buses are responsible for [33, 35]. 
 Current-carrying metal layer on top of the chip: Shielding metal layer on top of the 
whole chip can be current-carrying. Besides protecting from internal structure 
analysis, this metal layer also protects against attacks that use electrical 
measurements from the chip’s surface [33]. Consequently, if it is removed, the chip 
will not be operational. 
 Memory encryption: Encryption of the volatile and non-volatile memory and some 
microprocessor registers, with some specific keys [33, 35]. Even if the data is read 
from memory, it will still need to be decrypted. 
 Buses encryption: encryption of data in buses during transfer [35] 
 Anomaly sensors: The sensors are used to detect abnormal environmental 
conditions. Voltage monitoring, external clock monitoring, temperature monitoring 
are examples of available sensoring techniques [31, 33, 35]. It is important to note 
that clocking is provided by external source, consequently the processing speed of a 
smart card is also regulated by this external clocking source. It could be extremely 
20 
 
beneficial for an attacker to lower the frequency drastically to make measurements 
easier [33]. Therefore the clocking sensor should be implemented to protect against 
this attack. 
 Side-channel attacks are an example of non-invasive attacks. In the side-channel attack 
a device is being monitored during its normal operation in order to obtain some leaking 
information. Timing information, power consumption levels, electromagnetic leaks that are 
correlated with execution of some commands/computations on secret data can reveal some 
information about this secret data. The timing attack measures execution time of particular 
operations to get some knowledge about secret data. The power analysis can provide 
information about which operation and with what parameters is being executed based on the 
power consumption levels. The Differential power analysis (DPA) is even more powerful 
technique since the statistical analysis is applied to power measurements done while repeatedly 
processing known data and then unknown data to notice difference in the power consumption 
for different input data [31, 33]. As a result the unknown data can be revealed either partially or 
fully. The electromagnetic analysis deals with electromagnetic radiation from a chip, but the 
principle is the same. 
The usage of constant execution time algorithms which have the same execution time 
for different input values protects against timing attacks. However, microprocessors that have 
constant power consumption due to hardware tweaks are very expensive and are not practicable 
[38]. Random delays used in an algorithm and other more sophisticated masking techniques can 
decrease/destroy correlation between measured parameters and secret data [31, 38]. Besides, 
according to [38], most of these protection measures are weak against differential fault analysis.  
Differential fault analysis is based on injection of faults to disturb the operation of a 
microprocessor. Abnormal voltage, clocking, temperate, and electromagnetic influence can lead 
to skipped commands, misinterpreted commands, data read with errors [31]. Countermeasures 
include [31]: checksums, execution of the same commands several times and comparison of 
results, variable redundancy when a variable has a copy that is modified along with the original 
and then they are compared, etc. 
Smart cards are complex devices and security is achieved by combination of logical and 
physical protection measures. A security hole in one of these two layers can result in partial or 
complete compromise of a smart card. Thus careful design of software and hardware is crucial 
for smart card security. 
To evaluate and assure a security level provided by smart cards, a smart card’s claimed 
security functionality must be tested against some international standard. Common Criteria is 
an international security evaluation standard that checks the fulfillment of the security 
functionality of a product against some requirements. Evaluation is done by independent 
certified laboratories. The depth and the scope of the evaluation defines an evaluation assurance 
level (EAL) issued by a certifying organization. Thus EAL represents the level of confidence 
that the security functionality of a product meets the requirements [37]. There are seven 
assurance levels ranging from EAL1: “functionally tested” to EAL7: “formally verified design 
and tested”. Protection profiles describe a set of security features that must be provided for a 
specific product type. A developer of a product determines at which EAL the evaluation is made 
against a set of security requirements.  
A smart card has three distinct layers/modules: integrated circuit, operating system, 
applications. These components can be evaluated separately or as a whole system [35]. The 
modular approach (integrated circuit, OS, and applications are evaluated separately) is more 
favorable since the change in one module means reevaluation for that particular module and not 
for the whole platform [31, 35]. Besides, after the modular security evaluation a composition 
evaluation (IC, OS, and application as a one system) can be done [31]. 
Security is a cornerstone in a smart card development. The combination of logical and 
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physical security mechanisms that form a unified system, which optionally can be evaluated 
according to international standards, ensures a high level of security. This ability to store 
information and execute cryptographic protocols in a secure manner provided a great success 
for smart cards in security sensitive areas. 
 
 
2.3 Smart card OS and 3GPP applications 
The first smart card platforms were application specific. They were designed primary for 
one application, had a monolithic architecture, and were embedded in ROM [31, 33]. Thus it 
was quite problematic to introduce any modifications after the card was manufactured. The next 
generations of smart cards was characterized by decoupling of applications from the operating 
system. The introduction of multi-application smart cards to the mobile communication 
environment led to separate naming for a hardware part and a software part of the smart card. 
The hardware layer with low-level software is called the Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
(UICC), and the application for mobile telephony is called the Universal Subscriber Identity 
Module (USIM).  
The UICC card, besides the USIM application, can hold other applications like an 
application for mobile banking, an application for mobile payments, etc. The SIM application 
for GSM networks, the USIM application for UMTS networks, and the IP Multimedia Services 
Identity Module (ISIM) application for the IP Mobile Subsystem can reside on one UICC. 
Some of the modern commonly used open standard multi-application smart card 
platforms are: Multos, Java Card 3, and GlobalPlatform. Both Multos and Java  Card can 
contain USIM (SIM, ISIM, etc.) application, although the technology is quite different. Multos 
is a complete multi-application operating system while Java Card is just a platform that must 
reside on top of some operating system.  
The UICC card with the USIM application is owned and managed by a mobile operator. 
GlobalPlatform is a framework that enables secure post-issuance application management. 
Because of the enormous number of subscribers, the only possible and feasible solution for 
mobile operators to manage issued cards is Over-The-Air (OTA) management [31]. The OTA 
management is commonly performed via SMS bearer. However, because of its limited capacity 
another method that uses the Bearer Independent Protocol (BIP) with USIM application toolkit 
(USAT) is preferred. 
2.3.1 Java Card 3 
The Java Card platform provides a secure multi-application execution environment for 
Java applications on a smart card. The Java Card technology optimizes Java language and Java 
runtime environment for smart cards. It was specially designed for constraint-based chips and 
does not have all functionality of the standard Java technology. However, the continuous 
progress in the smart card manufacturing allows to gradually increase the platform 
functionality. For example, the Java Card Platform Connected Edition provides support for 
multithreading and concurrent execution of applications; it also supports Web applications that 
can interact with off-card clients via HTTP/HTTPS [42]. 
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The Java Card platform consists of the Java Card platform virtual machine, the Java 
Card platform runtime environment, and the Java Card application programming interface 
(API). The central part of the Java Card platform is the Java Card virtual machine that is a 
runtime Java bytecode interpreter. It is responsible for the applet execution and security. The 
Java Card virtual machine acts as an abstraction layer between the underlying OS and applets 
executed by this virtual machine. Thus, the smart card operating system's complexity is hidden, 
which simplifies application development [31], and the portability of Java applications is 
provided. Figure 3.4.1 depicts the Java Card architecture. 
Figure 2.3.1.1: Java Card architecture 
The Java Card virtual machine is never terminated. It works till the end of the lifetime of 
the smart card [39]. The Java Card virtual machine stops temporary when the power supply is 
removed, and it resumes its work and state when it is powered on again [39]. The Java Card 
virtual machine’s lifetime starts when it is burned with the smart card operating system into the 
ROM of the smart card [31]. 
The Java Card platform security is ensured by the following security features [40]: the 
transaction atomicity, cryptographic classes, and the applet firewall. In addition, secure applet 
loading, installation, and deletion is provided.  
Transaction atomicity means that a data modification occurs only if a transaction was 
completed normally and fully, otherwise the transaction is canceled and the card returns to its 
state before transaction started. 
The applet firewall is a mechanism that provides applet isolation. Every applet receives 
a designated memory area and no other applet can access that area unless specifically allowed 
by the applet that owns that memory area [41]. It means that objects can be shared by applets 
and applets can interact, but it should be explicitly allowed. 
The Java Card security and cryptography classes support [40]: public and private key 
cryptography, digital signatures, message digests, random number generation, and PIN 
management. This, for example, enables Java Card applications to communicate securely over 
the network with off-card peers using SSL/TLS. 
The Java Card platform allows applet management after a card was issued. The 
following post-issuance functions are supported: loading, installation, and deletion of 
applications. The security is ensured by checking the digital signature of a new applet. Besides, 
Applet
Java Card framework APIs
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the Java Card platform allows delegating some card management functions to card management 
frameworks like GlobalPlatform. 
2.3.2 GlobalPlatform 
GlobalPlatform is a framework for smart cards that allows to simplify and accelerate 
development, deployment, and management of applications. It specifies an open and 
interoperable infrastructure for smart card systems. GlobalPlatform enables post-issuance smart 
card customization by reconfiguring and loading/installing new applications to the smart card 
under the full control of the card issuer. Thus, GlobalPlatform smart cards can be modified to 
perform various operations. 
The GlobalPlatform architecture consists of the following elements [43]: 
 Runtime environment: includes a smart card operating system, a virtual machine, and an 
Application Programming Interface (API). For example, the Java Card platform 
deployed on some smart card operating system can form a runtime environment for 
GlobalPlatform; 
 GlobalPlatform API: consists primary of APIs that enable an off-card entity to 
communicate securely with a Card Manager and use services related to the card 
application management, for example locking the card [43]; 
 Card Manager: The Card Manager is the main controlling entity in the GlobalPlatform 
framework [31]. It allows the issuer of the smart card to have full control over the smart 
card. All communication with off-card entities is received by the Card Manager which is 
responsible for dispatching of received commands to appropriate applications. The Card 
manager is also in charge of controlling the content of the smart card. It keeps track of 
all installed applications. Loading and installation of new applications must be allowed 
by the Card Manager [43]. The Card Manager also provides cardholder verification 
mechanisms like the Global PIN code [31]. Besides, it is responsible for managing 
secure communication channels when some sensitive off-card communication is done. 
Each application is assigned a security domain. The Card Manager serves as issuer's 
security domain that controls issuer's applications on the card. Issuer's security domain 
holds issuer's secret keys, provides secure communication channels, and managers 
issuer's applications; 
 Card applications: include various applications that can be managed by the issuer, or the 
management can be delegated to application providers [31]; 
 Security domains: security domains protect applications or group of applications. 
Security domains allow an application/service provider to control its applications on its 
own. Each service provider has its own security domain. Delegated management with 
security domains allows the application provider to perform loading, installation, and 
deletion of its applications. However, the issuer must authorize the application provider 
to perform these content management operations. Authorization is done by granting the 
application  provider a cryptographic token that contains a digital signature of the issuer.  
When the application provider needs to manage its applications it presents the token to 
the Card Manager. 
GlobalPlatform allows customization of a smart card in a secure manner so that the 
issuer always has full control over the smart card. It is becoming de facto the standard solution 
for loading and managing smart card applications [31]. Besides, it is able to work on top of any 
smart card operating system. These features have resulted that as of October 2009 
approximately 450 million GlobalPlatform-based smart cards have been deployed worldwide 
[44]. 
24 
 
2.3.3 Multos 
Multos is an open standard multi-application operating systems for smart cards. It is an 
extremely secure architecture. Multos achieved ITSEC E6 level certification that corresponds to 
Common Criteria EAL7 [45].  
The Multos architecture consists of [46]: 
 Multos operating system: OS is responsible for input/output, file management, 
cryptographic services, etc; 
 MULTOS Application Abstract (or Virtual) Machine: Multos Executable Language 
(MEL) is a byte code language that is interpreted by the virtual machine. 
Applications for the Multos architecture are developed using high level languages 
like C or Java and then compiled into the MEL byte code. The Multos virtual 
machine lies between the OS and applications. Thus it enables interoperability of 
applications between different Multos implementations [31]; 
 MEL API: MEL APIs for high level programming languages provide interface for 
application development independent from a hardware platform; 
 applications: various MULTOS application programs. 
Multos security system provides the following features [45]: 
 only the card issuer has control over loading and installation of applications onto 
the card. The issuer can provide trusted third parties with cryptographic certificates 
that will allow them to load applications; 
 an application cannot access the memory of another application. Execution-time 
checking of bytecode instructions ensures that illegal instructions or accesses 
attempts to memory areas of other applications are rejected by the virtual machine. 
Data sharing between applications is prohibited [47]; 
 existing applications are not effected by loading or removing of other applications; 
 application loading mechanism ensures authenticy, integrity, and confidentiality of 
application data. 
Convergence of mobile, security, and banking applications on one card requires a high 
level of security, and Multos is currently one of the most secure platforms. Unlike Java Card 
and GlobalPlatform, it does not need any underlying operating system since OS is defined in 
the Multos architecture. Besides, the Multos platform provides support for the post-issuance 
management of operator-specific applications via the OTA mechanism. 
2.3.4 3GPP applications 
Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application resides on the UICC card. It 
contains the logic that controls subscriber – network mutual authentication and cryptographic 
key agreement, secure storage of  mobile service related information (secret keys, subscriber 
identity, etc.), and communication with a mobile equipment (ME). The UICC card contains an 
operating system on which the USIM application is running. Besides the USIM application, 
UICC can support other 3GPP applications like ISIM, SIM, USIM Application Toolkit, etc [48]. 
However, if the UICC contains both the USIM and the SIM application, then the ME shall 
always use the USIM application regardless of the radio access technology [50]. It means that a 
possibly existing SIM application will never be used if the USIM application is present. 
During the network operation phase messages exchanged between the ME and the 3GPP 
application are in the form of command/response pairs [48]. And the ME plays the role of the 
master and application plays the role of the slave in this communication. 
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The UICC card file system has a hierarchical tree structure. It consists of the following 
elements [49]: 
 Master File (MF) - the root of the file system; 
 Dedicated File (DF) – enables functional grouping of files. It acts as directory. An 
Application DF (ADF) is a DF that contains all the DFs and EFs of an application; 
 Elementary File (EF) - a file that contains various data.  
Standards specify UICC file system access control mechanism and security environment, which 
provides protection for applications by assigning security containers for every activated 
application. The UICC security architecture consists of the following elements [49]: 
 Security attributes: a set of access rules. Security attributes are attached to an 
ADF/DF/EF files; 
 Access rules: consist of the set of requirements that must be met in order to perform 
operations on a file. Access rules define what operations can be performed and 
which security conditions must be met before performing these operations;  
 Access Mode (AM): indicates to which operations the security condition applies; 
 Security Condition (SC): specifies which security procedures (for example PIN 
verification) must be made before a command may be performed on a file. 
Since the USIM application must be able to work with various mobile equipment 
platforms, it was comprehensively standardized and conformance tests were defined [31]. The 
USIM application specification among other things defines [50]: 
 file structures; 
 contents of EFs; 
 security functions; 
 application protocol to be used on the interface between UICC (USIM) and ME. 
The USIM application stores all information in EFs, except for the shared secret key 
used for authentication. EFs can be mandatory, optional, or conditional. A conditional file is 
mandatory if it is required by some supported application feature. Some of the categories of 
information that the USIM application stores in EFs are: service-related information, phone 
book and call information, messaging information, location information.  
Some of the important files defined by the USIM application specifications are provided below. 
Table 2.3.4.1: USIM application files 
File name Description 
EFIMSI (IMSI) contains the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). The file is 
mandatory. 
EFMSISDN 
(MSISDN) 
contains The Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number 
(MSISDN). This file is optional. 
EFSPN contains the service provider name. The file is optional. 
EFKeys  contains the ciphering key CK, the integrity key IK and the key set 
identifier KSI. The file is mandatory. 
EFKeysPS  contains the ciphering key CKPS, the integrity key IKPS and the key set 
identifier KSIPS for the packet switched (PS) domain. The file is 
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mandatory. 
EFUST Indicates which services (SMS, MMS, Local phone book, GSM Access, 
etc.) are provided by the USIM. The file is mandatory. 
EFLOCI contains the following Location Information: 
 Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI); 
  Location Area Information (LAI); 
  Location update status 
EFPSLOCI contains the following Packet Switched location information: 
 Packet Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (P-TMSI); 
 Packet Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity signature value (P-
TMSI signature value); 
  Routing Area Information (RAI); 
  Routing Area update status. 
EFSMS This file is present if SMS service in USIM is available 
This EF contains information concerning received/sent short messages  
EFNETPAR  contains information about network cell frequency parameters 
EFNCP-IP This file is optional. It contains network connectivity parameters for 
USIM IP connections 
EFKc This file is present if “GSM access”service is available. It contains the 
GSM ciphering key Kc and the ciphering key sequence number n. 
EFKcGPRS This file is present if “GSM access”service is available. It contains the 
GPRS ciphering key KcGPRS and the ciphering key sequence number n.  
 
USIM standards specify different procedures that can be used by the mobile equipment 
to interact with the USIM. The ME can read/modify/delete information that is related to mobile 
communication service and stored on the UICC by interacting with the USIM application. 
Some of the procedures are described bellow [50]: 
 USIM management procedures: include USIM intitializataion, 3G session termination, 
USIM application closure, USIM service table request (reading of EFUST), etc. 
 USIM security related procedures: include Authentication algorithms computation, 
IMSI request, Access control information request, reading/updating of cipher and 
integrity key, reading/updating location information, etc. 
 Subscription related procedures: creation/deletion of information in the USIM phone 
book, reading/updating/erasing SMS messages from the USIM, etc. 
 USIM provides the following set of security features [50]: 
 authentication of the USIM to the network; 
 authentication of the network to the USIM; 
 authentication of the user to the USIM; 
 data confidentiality over the radio interface; 
 file access conditions; 
 conversion functions to derive GSM parameters. 
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A 3GPP application uses two Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to authenticate a 
user [48]: level 1 verification requirements (PIN) and the level 2 verification requirements 
(PIN2). The PIN has a global access scope. Any file on the UICC that has the PIN referenced in 
access rules is accessible with this PIN [49]. It becomes an application PIN if it is assigned to 
that application. The PIN2 has a local scope. Besides these two PINs there is also a Universa l 
PIN that is shared among several applications in multi-application cards. Application can use 
the Universal PIN as a replacement for the PIN. 
Another application that can reside on the UICC is the IP multimedia Services Identity 
Module (ISIM) application. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is a framework which 
combines data, voice, and video communication services on a single IP network. It is an open 
standardized architecture independent of access technologies (mobile, wireless, fixed network) 
that allows fast and easy introduction of new services [51]. This flexibility is accomplished by 
the introduction of an intermediate layer between the operator core network and applications. 
IMS architecture specifies three distinct layers: transport, session control, and application layer. 
It utilizes media gateways to convert different multimedia services into the IP domain. Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) is used for sessions (data, video, voice) management and registration 
of subscribers. Application servers provide services to customers.  
To use IMS services a subscriber should be registered and authenticated.  The ISIM is 
responsible for these operations in a networks with IMS architecture. It basically has the same 
functions as USIM application in UMTS architecture. 
Some of the important files defined by the ISIM application specifications [52] are provided 
below. 
Table 2.3.4.2: ISIM application files 
File name Description 
EFIMPI contains the IMS private user identity of the user 
EFIMPU contains one or more public SIP Identity (SIP URI) of the user 
EFDOMAIN Contains the Home Network Domain Name 
 
IMS identification is based on IMPI/IMPU identifiers and authentication is based on the 
shared secret stored in ISIM [51]. The ISIM supports Authentication and Key Agreement 
(AKA) protocol, defined in RFC 3310, for mutual subscriber - network authentication and 
generation of keys for IPsec encryption and integrity protection of the SIP messages between 
the mobile equipment and the SIP proxy server [53]. 
2.3.5 USIM application toolkit and SATSA 
The USIM application toolkit (USAT) provides mechanisms which allow applications, 
existing on the UICC, to interact and operate with the ME [53]. It allows the USIM to initiate 
actions to be performed by the ME. The requests/commands that can be carried out are 
standardized. Some of the proactive actions are the following: 
 displaying text or multimedia messages from the UICC to the terminal; 
 sending short messages; 
 setting up a voice call to a number held by the UICC; 
 request ME's local information (IMEI, current time, language settings, etc); 
 initiating a dialogue with the user; 
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 requesting the terminal to report geographical location information to the UICC 
However, to use these mechanisms USIM must first determine capabilities of the ME. 
This is done during UICC initialization when the ME sends a profile with supported features. If 
no profile is sent, then UICC assumes that USAT is not supported. 
One of the most powerful commands is CALL CONTROL [31]. Before setting up the 
call, all dialed digits and supplementary call control information is passed to the USIM [53]. 
The USIM can allow, modify, or block the call. It could, for example, be used to assist the user 
with dialing numbers by adding the country code automatically [31]. 
USAT supports Bearer Independent Protocol (BIP) that allows USIM to download data 
through the ME's high speed data bearers (Bluetooth, GPRS, 3G, etc) instead of using slow 
SMS bearer. 
However, ME vendors do not provide sufficient support for the USAT and prefer to 
implement all features in the ME [31]. The handset developers are more interested in exploiting 
USIM functionality by mobile applications residing on the ME. For example, the Security and 
Trust Services API (SATSA) allows J2ME applications to communicate with smart card 
devices, including Java Card platform cards and UICC cards with USIM [54]. SATSA also 
provides security APIs for the management of digital signatures, digital certificates, and 
cryptographic operations.  
J2ME application can use the functionality of the UICC card such as the phone book or 
applets. SATSA allows exploiting smart card security features like: secure data storage, 
cryptographic primitives, and secure execution environment. 
 
2.4 Bluetooth technology and security 
This section describes the Bluetooth technology, protocols, and studies authentication 
and encryption mechanisms provided by Bluetooth.  
2.4.1 Bluetooth technology and protocols 
Bluetooth is a low power short-range wireless communications technology. It operates 
in the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band at 2.4 GHz. Bluetooth emulates 
full-duplex transmission using a time-division duplex (TDD) scheme [55, 56]. The Core 
Specification defines a minimum connection range of 10 meters. The specified connection 
range for class 1 Bluetooth radios is 100 m, and manufactures can exceed this value since there 
is no range limitation [57]. Bluetooth version 2.0 EDR supports data rates up to 3 Mbps, 
version 3.0 HS supports up to 24 Mbps. 
Bluetooth connection utilizes master-slave relationship when one of devices acts as a 
master and the other as a slave [55, 56]. The master is responsible for providing synchronization 
parameters. A group of devices synchronized in this way forms a piconet. 
The Bluetooth core system protocols are the Radio (RF) protocol, Link Control (LC) 
protocol, Link Manager protocol (LMP) and Logical Link Control and Adaptation protocol 
(L2CAP) [55, 56]. The Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) is another extremely important 
service layer protocol that is required by all Bluetooth applications [55, 56]. 
The Bluetooth generic data transport architecture consists of three layers: physical layer, 
logical layer, and L2CAP layer [55, 56]. Physical layer has two sub-layers: physical channel 
and physical link. On top of the physical layer resides a set of logical links and channels in the 
following sequence: logical transport, logical link, and L2CAP channel. Physical link is formed 
between each slave and master to provide transmission of data. Logical links use the physical 
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link as a transport. One or several logical links are multiplexed on the physical link. Logical 
links support unicast synchronous, asynchronous, isochronous traffic, and broadcast traffic [55, 
56]. Creation, modification, and termination of logical links are handled by link managers on 
peering devices. Link managers communicate via LMP. 
L2CAP layer provides logical channels for the transport of higher service protocols and 
application data [55, 56]. L2CAP performs protocol/channel multiplexing, segmentation and 
reassembly (SAR), per-channel flow control, and error control [55, 56]. L2CAP can also 
provide Quality of Service (QoS) for applications [55, 56]. Channels can be both connection-
oriented and connectionless. Connection-oriented L2CAP channels are for unicast traffic, while 
connectionless are for broadcast data transport [55]. Unicast channels may be uni-directional or 
bi-directional. L2CAP signaling channel is responsible for creation and establishment of 
connection-oriented channels and negotiation of changes for both connection oriented and 
connectionless channels. Channels are identified by channel identifiers (CID). Each end-point 
of the channel has its own CID. 
L2CAP can operate in the following modes [55]: 
• Basic L2CAP Mode: it is a default mode. It is equivalent to L2CAP 
specification in Bluetooth v1.1. It is used if no other mode is used. 
• Flow Control Mode: PDUs are numbered and acknowledged. Missing PDUs 
are detected, but there are no retransmissions  
• Retransmission Mode: PDUs are numbered and acknowledged. Missing 
PDUs are retransmitted. 
• Enhanced Retransmission Mode: added in Bluetooth Core Specification v3.0 
+ HS [56]. It provides some enhancements to Retransmission mode. 
• Streaming Mode: added in Bluetooth Core Specification v3.0 + HS [56]. 
PDUs are numbered, but they are not acknowledged. Used for real-time 
isochronous traffic. 
According to [56] the Flow Control mode and Retransmission modes should be used only in 
case when one of the peers does not support the Enhanced Retransmission or the Streaming 
mode. 
  L2CAP is frame-oriented. Applications that do not need transmission of data in frames 
can avoid L2CAP layer and work directly with baseband logical links [55, 56]. Depending on 
the mode of operation, L2CAP PDUs have different structure. The information payload size 
ranges from 0 to 65535 bytes, though in some connection modes the upper bound can be 
slightly smaller, but no less than 65527 bytes. 
The Bluetooth interoperability between different devices is provided for some specific 
service(s) and use case(s) [55, 56]. Bluetooth profiles specify subset of messages and 
procedures from Bluetooth specifications and corresponding use cases. Devices that want to 
interoperate should conform to some common profile. Generic Access Profile (GAP) defines 
general procedures that can be used to establish connections, discover devices, etc. It defines 
generic modes of operation that are not service- or profile-specific and that can be used by 
profiles referring to this profile [55, 56]. Devices that conform to some other profile must be 
compatible with devices compliant to this profile [55, 56]. It means that GAP ensures basic 
compatibility between all Bluetooth devices. 
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Figure 2.4.1.1: Profile stack covered by Generic Access Profile [55, 56] 
SDP is a protocol for discovering services in Bluetooth environment and for determining 
characteristics of those services. It supports discovery of existing services without any prior 
knowledge of those services, besides, it also support searching of services based on the class of 
service or some specific attributes [55, 56]. SDP uses L2CAP as its transport protocol.  SDP is 
a request/response client-server protocol. The client issues requests and the server answers 
them. The server has a list of service records, which describe services, associated with the 
server. One record describes one service. The service record is a list of service attributes. One 
attribute describes one service characteristic (e.g. ServiceName, ServiceClassIDList, etc.). 
Each service belongs to some service class [55, 56]. The service class defines values for 
all attributes in the service record. Every service class has a 128-bit universally unique 
identifier (UUID).  ServiceClassIDList contains a list of service classes of which the service is 
an instance. Attribute values in the service record must conform to all classes in the 
ServiceClassIDList simultaneously. Therefore, service classes contained in the list are related 
[55, 56]. 
Pre-allocated UUIDs have 16-bit UUID and 32-bit UUID aliases (short representation of 
the 128-bit value). It is impossible to search for services based on the values of arbitrary 
attributes; the search is based on UUIDs that describe the service [55, 56]. A service search 
pattern is a list that contains one or more UUIDs. It is used to find matching services. The 
service matches the search pattern if the record that represents the service contains all required 
UUIDs. 
RFCOMM is a serial cable emulation protocol that provides transfer of serial data [58].  
RFCOMM can establish up to 60 simultaneous connections between two Bluetooth devices. 
OBEX is a protocol that exchanges data objects that are defined by the OBEX protocol itself 
[59]. A Bluetooth device using OBEX is considered to be a client of the protocol. RFCOMM is 
a main transport protocol for OBEX. 
 
2.4.2 Bluetooth security 
Generic Access Profile defines a generic authentication procedure that specifies how the 
LMP-authentication and LMP-pairing procedures are used. It also describes 4 security modes (3 
of them are legacy modes) that provide different levels of security [55, 56]. The legacy security 
Baseband [Link Controller (LC)]
Link Manager Protocol (LMP)
L2CAP
RFCOMM
Telephony Control
Protocol (TCS)
Service Discovery
Protocol (SDP)
Object Exchange
Protocol (OBEX)
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modes are for devices that support Bluetooth v2.0 + EDR and earlier: 
 Security mode 1: is a non-secure mode that does not use any security mechanisms 
 Security mode 2: is a service level enforced security mode in which services request 
security mechanisms. Device does not initiate any security procedures before the 
start of the L2CAP channel establishment procedure. Bluetooth device can specify 
the following security requirements: 
• Authorization required 
• Authentication required 
• Encryption required  
In case no security requirements are specified, this mode is equivalent to the first 
mode [55, 56]. 
 Security mode 3: is a link level enforced security mode. It means that security 
procedures are initiated before LMP completes link setup [55, 56]. This mode 
supports shared secret key authentication and encryption [60]. 
Security modes 1 and 3 are excluded in Bluetooth Core Specifications v2.1  + EDR and 
v3.0 +HS. Security mode 2 is used for backwards compatibility with legacy devices [55, 56]. 
Security mode 4 is the only non-legacy security mode defined in these specifications. It is a 
service level enforced security mode. Services can specify the following security requirements 
[55, 56]: 
 Authenticated link key required 
 Unauthenticated link key required 
 No security required 
The first two options utilize Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) procedure to create the 
connection. The Authenticated link key required uses either the numeric comparison, out-of-
band, or passkey entry SSP association model. The Unauthenticated link key required uses just 
works SSP association model. By default, GAP chooses the unauthenticated link key and 
enabling encryption if both pairing devices support SSP. 
Secure Simple Pairing 
Secure Simple Pairing was designed to provide more user-friendly pairing procedure 
and improved security [55, 56].  It provides protection against passive eavesdropping and 
against man-in-the-middle attacks (in some association models) [55, 56]. Protection against 
passive eavesdropping is provided by Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) public key 
cryptography used by SSP. 
SSP procedure consists of five phases: 
 Phase 1: Public key exchange 
 Phase 2: Authentication Stage 1 
 Phase 3: Authentication Stage 2 
 Phase 4: Link key calculation 
 Phase 5: LMP Authentication and Encryption 
During phase 1 pairing devices generate ECDH public-private key pair, exchange public 
keys, and compute common Diffie Hellman key. The authentication stage 1 differs among SSP 
association models, all the rest phases are similar [55, 56]. 
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Authentication Stage 1 (Numeric Comparison Protocol): It is used for scenarios when 
both pairing devices have a display and both are capable of having the user enter "yes" or "no" 
[55, 56]. In this stage each device generates a 128-bit nonce, and then devices publicly 
exchange them. Nonces are needed to prevent replay attacks [55, 56]. Then the commitment 
value, which cryptographically binds these nonces to the public keys exchanged in phase 1, is 
computed on each side. If commitment check succeeds, each device computes a 6-digit 
confirmation value and shows it to the user. Both devices should have displays to use this mode.  
The user should check whether the numbers are the same on both devices. If the values are the 
same it means that nonces were successfully exchanged between intended devices. This 
association model provides limited protection against man-in-the-middle attacks [55, 56]. 
Authentication Stage 1 (Just Works): used in scenarios when one of the pairing devices 
neither has a display nor a way to enter a 6-digit number [55, 56]. This association model 
utilizes Numeric Comparison Protocol, but never displays any numbers to confirm. The user 
may be just asked to confirm the connection. The Just Works protects only against passive 
eavesdropping. It is susceptible to the man-in-the-middle attack. 
Authentication Stage 1 (Passkey Entry): the user inputs the same 6-digit passkey on both 
pairing devices. The other option is to generate the passkey on one of the devices and display 
the value to the user. The user is then required to enter this value into another device. This mode 
provides protection against the man-in-the-middle attack. 
Authentication Stage 1 (Out of Band Protocol): this association model is used when 
some out-of-band mechanism is used to both discover the devices and to exchange 
cryptographic values used in the pairing process. In-band discovery of the peer device followed 
by the usage of out-of-band channel for transmission of authentication parameters is not 
supported [55, 56].  
Authentication stage 2 is used to ensure that peers successfully completed exchange in 
Authentication stage 1 and to confirm the peering between devices. Unlike in Authentication 
stage 1, there is no user intervention in stage 2. The pairing devices generate two values based 
on the exchanged nonces in authentication stage 1 and the common Diffie Hellman key 
generated as a result of the first phase. Devices mutually exchange values and check whether 
they match.  
In phase 4 devices compute common link key based on the Diffie Hellman key and the 
publicly exchanged data. In phase 5 pairing devices generate encryption key from the link key. 
This phase is the same as in legacy pairing. 
In legacy security modes 2 and 3 the authentication is performed based on the PIN code. 
PIN is used as an input to compute initialization key that in turn is used to compute the link key. 
The PIN can either be a fixed number or a value selected by the user. The user can select the 
PIN and then enter it in each of the devices that are to be paired. 
Authenticated link keys are stronger than Unauthenticated, and Unauthenticated link 
keys are considered to be stronger than legacy link keys [55, 56]. 
LMP authentication and encryption 
Bluetooth LMP authentication is a simple challenge-response scheme. LMP 
authentication starts after the link key was derived. LMP authentication uses the link key as a 
shared secret to perform authentication. The verifier sends the claimant a 128-bit random value. 
The claimant takes received random value, its own Bluetooth address, and the shared link key 
and uses them as input to the block cipher SAFER-SK128 to produce authentication code [55, 
56]. This code is sent to the verifier. For mutual authentication verifier and claimant switch 
rolls. 
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Bluetooth utilizes a stream cipher algorithm E0 for encryption. Each packet payload is 
encrypted separately. The keystream generation algorithm is based on the linear feedback shift 
registers (LFSRs). Three modes are available for baseband encryption [55, 56]: 
1. No encryption: no messages are encrypted; 
2. Point-to-point only encryption: broadcast messages are not encrypted;  
3. Point-to-point and broadcast encryption: all messages are encrypted. 
Bluetooth provides a basic data integrity check using 16-bit CRC code [55, 56]. The 
data integrity check is optional. The CRC field is appended to the end of the packet. CRC is 
computed over every octet of the packet header and packet payload. The payload is ciphered 
after the CRC is appended, thus the CRC field is encrypted [55, 56]. Although Bluetooth has a 
basic data integrity check, it is much weaker than cryptographically protected data integrity 
check with message authentication codes (MACs). 
Another Bluetooth security problem is that the stream cipher algorithm E0 has some 
security flaws [60] and is considered weak [98]. 
Summary 
Bluetooth Security mode 4 with SSP is the most secure solution for device pairing. 
Besides, this mode, unlike legacy modes, does not require the knowledge of the shared secret 
PIN from both sides. The “Just works” association model being susceptible to the man-in-the-
middle attack cannot be used in environments where high security is required. Thus, we 
consider the SSP “Numeric comparison” and “Passkey entry” association models to be a 
suitable solution to establish a secure Bluetooth channel. 
Bluetooth provides authentication and protection of user data by encryption of the 
packet payload. However, it does not provide cryptographic integrity protection and the 
encryption algorithm has some security flaws. 
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3. Analysis 
In this chapter, the Windows logon architecture is analyzed. This chapter also contains an 
evaluation of existing authentication schemes based on mobile phones, and an evaluation of the 
Windows logon extensibility. 
3.1 Authentication and authorization in Windows 
This subchapter contains a study of security mechanisms in Windows, a study of 
authentication and logon process, and an analysis of Windows smart card architecture. 
3.1.1 Security principals and access to objects 
Security in Windows is based on the subject-object-actions relationship. When a subject 
requests to perform some actions on an object, the operating system checks whether the access 
should be granted based on security permissions associated with that object. According to [61], 
a subject (security principal) can be: a user, a computer, and a service (starting with Windows 
Vista and Windows Server 2008). An object can be [62]: a file, a device, a job, a process, a 
thread, shared memory sections, volumes, etc.  
To make a decision whether to grant some principal access to an object, the operating 
system must know the identity of the principal. Therefore, prior to be able to access resources a 
user must authenticate to the system during the Windows logon process. Windows uses unique 
security identifiers (SIDs) to identify security principals. A SID is assigned during the logon 
process. 
The structure of the SID: 
S – 1 – 5 – 21 – 2443930396 – 124871960 – 1960245352 – 1000 
                            Domain identifier                            RID 
 S – SID designator. Consists of character "S"; 
 1 – revision number of the SID specification; 
 5 – authority identifier. For SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY the value is 5. Other 
possible values are: SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY, 
SECURITY_LOCAL_SID_AUTHORITY, etc; 
 Domain identifier – identifies a domain or computer that issued SID; 
 RID – Relative identifier. RIDs are used to ensure uniqueness of SIDs. RIDs for 
non-default users and groups start with 1000 and increase by 1 for every new 
principal. 
All accounts (users and groups) in the Windows system can be divided in two classes: 
user-defined and automatically created by the system. Automatically created groups can be 
further divided in built-in and system groups. System groups have automatic and dynamic 
membership that is dependent on the principal's activity type. Built-in groups, on the other 
hand, are not much different from user-defined groups and are used to support a default 
Windows security model [63]. 
Some well-known built-in accounts in the Windows system. 
Table 3.1.1.1: Built-in accounts in Windows 
SID user/group description 
S-1-5-domain-500 Administrator Built-in system administrator account 
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S-1-5-domain-501 Guest Built-in account that can be used to give limited 
access to those who do not have personal 
account 
S-1-5-domain-502  KRBTGT  Service account used by Kerberos KDC 
S-1-5-domain-512  Domain Admins  Members of this group are authorized to 
administer a domain.  
S-1-5-domain-513  Domain Users  Includes all user accounts in a domain 
S-1-5-domain-515  Domain Computers  This group includes client stations and servers in 
a domain 
S-1-5-32-544  Administrators  Initially contains Administrator account as the 
only member. After the system joins a domain, 
Domain Admins group is added to this group. 
 
Table 3.1.1.2: Well-known system groups in Windows 
S-1-1-0  Everyone  This group includes completely all users 
S-1-2-0  Local This group includes users who log on to 
computer locally via  connected terminal  
S-1-5-2  Network  Contains users who log on via a network 
S-1-5-4  Interactive  Includes users that log on interactively. Terminal 
server users are in this group, but they are not 
included in Local group [61]. 
S-1-5-5-X-Y  Logon Session  This SID is used to identify a logon session, not 
a principal. Each logon session of a user is 
assigned a unique ID (X and Y values are 
changed) 
S-1-5-11  Authenticated users Contains authenticated users 
 
After a user is successfully authenticated, Windows creates an access token for that user.  
Access token contains the SID of the user, SIDs of all groups in which the user is a member 
(including built-in and system groups), the SID identifying logon session, privileges assigned to 
the user and to user's groups, etc. If privileges assigned to the user or to one of the groups in 
which the user is a member change, or the user membership in some group changes, then the 
user must relogin in order for the changes to take affect [63]. When the user relogins, a new 
access token that contains updated information is created. Every process and thread executed on 
behalf of the user gets a copy of the user's access token. When a process or a thread request 
access to some securable object they present an access token to the system for the access 
control check. 
Every securable object in the system has a security descriptor associated with it. The 
security descriptor describes who can have access to an object and what kind of access is 
allowed. It contains the following information: the SID of the owner of the object, the SID of 
the primary group of the owner (according to [61], primary groups in Windows access control 
model are used only for POSIX compliance), a system access control list (SACL), and a 
discretionary access control list (DACL). 
DACL defines users and groups and whether they are allowed to access an object. If an 
object does not have associated DACL then everyone can access it [65]. DACL consists of a 
36 
 
number of access control entries (ACEs). The ACE contains the SID of the subject, the flag that 
shows if access is allowed/denied, and an access mask that defines access rights for that subject. 
If DACL for an object contains no ACEs (empty DACL) then no one can access the object [67]. 
Windows has the following access rights [66]: 
 generic access rights: include READ, WRITE, EXECUTE, and GENERIC_ALL that is 
combination of all three 
 standard access rights: include DELETE – the right to delete an object, 
READ_CONTROL – the right to read object's security descriptor, WRITE_DAC – the 
right to modify DACL, WRITE_OWNER – the right to change the owner of the object, 
and SYNCHRONIZE right. 
 SACL access right: the rights to get or set SACL in the object's security descriptor 
 object-specific access rights: for a example, the right to create files in a directory is 
FILE_ADD_FILE  
SACL controls whether attempts to access an object are logged. ACEs in SACL specify 
which access attempt types and by which subjects should be logged. Both failures and 
successful attempts are logged. Most objects in the Windows system do not have SACL [61].  
In the discretionary access control model an owner of an object defines access 
permissions for other users and groups. In Windows system the owner of an object and the 
system administrator have a full control over the object. When the object has empty DACL no 
one (even the owner) can access the object, but the owner can still modify access permissions 
[61]. However, if the DACL of the object contains ACE with the SID S-1-3-4 
“OWNER_RIGHTS”, then implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC rights of the owner 
are ignored. This mechanism was introduced in order to prevent users from modifying 
permissions for their own files [61]. 
When a process or a thread requests excess to a securable object, the system checks the 
provided access token against the DACL of the object considering the requested access type. 
ACEs in the DACL are checked sequentially for SIDs that match those in access token until 
access (everything that was requested) is granted or denied or the end of DACL is reached. It 
means that access is granted when one or more access allowed ACEs permit all requested 
access rights for any subset of SIDs in the security token of the principal [68]. Access is denied 
when the deny ACE, for one of the SIDs in the access token, that denies any of the  requested 
access rights is encountered in the DACL [68]. If the end of the DACL was reached and there is 
some requested access right that was not allowed by ACEs, then access is denied. 
Users of the Windows system have rights and privileges. A privilege is a right to 
perform system-related management operations like changing time, rebooting the system, 
loading drivers, etc. [69]. Thus, privileges differ from access rights that subjects have to 
securable objects. Privileges are held in the assigned access token whereas access rights are 
defined in the security descriptor of securable objects. It is important to distinguish user rights 
(logon rights) and access rights to securable objects. Logon rights are like privileges except the 
fact that they are used to allow a user to log on to the system, and privileges determine what a 
user can do after logon [61, 63]. Some of the logon rights are presented in the following table. 
Table 3.1.1.3: Logon rights in Windows 
Logon right Description 
Access this computer from a 
network  
determines which users/groups can logon via a network. By 
default this right is granted to everyone. 
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Allow log on locally  defines who can interactively logon to the system via 
connected terminal 
Allow log on through 
Terminal Services  
defines who can logon to a remote computer via Remote 
Desktop Protocol [63] 
Deny access to this computer 
from network  
defines for whom network logon is denied 
Deny log on locally  defines for whom local logon is denied 
 
Role-based access control 
The Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is an alternative to the discretionary access 
control system that is used in Windows. Access to resources is based on a role. It means that 
privileges are assigned to roles. The role is an abstraction that reflects which operations and job 
functions a user can perform. When a user is assigned to a role he obtains privileges of that role.  
Windows Authorization Manager (AzMan) provides support for RBAC in Windows. 
Administrative tools allow to define role-based authorization policies against which access 
control check will be made. 
3.1.2 Authentication and logon process 
There are two authentication/logon models in Windows – interactive and noninteractive. 
The interactive authentication means that the user is prompted for credentials. The 
noninteractive authentication uses credentials previously entered by a user during interactive 
authentication. It means that the interactive authentication must always precede the 
noninteactive authentication. Noninteractive authentication occurs when a user requests 
connection to other stations/servers in  the domain. 
The interactive logon to the system can be either a local or a domain logon. In case of 
the local interactive logon a user gets access only to the local system resources, and in case of 
the interactive domain logon a user gets access to resources of the whole domain. 
Logon process in Windows XP 
Windows XP interactive logon architecture includes the following components: 
 Winlogon process 
 Graphical Identification and Authentication (GINA) 
 Local Security Authority (LSA) 
 Authentication packages (NTLM and Kerberos) 
 The Winlogon process is responsible for managing logon procedure. It ensures that no 
other illegal processes can intercept logon information supplied by a user [62]. Winlogon relies 
on the GINA dynamic link library to obtain user's logon information. After credentials are 
obtained GINA calls the LSA to authenticate the user by using one of the authentication 
packages. Authentication packages are DLLs that encapsulate the authentication logic. The 
result of authentication is returned to GINA which in turn returns it to Winlogon. Winlogon 
starts user's shell if authentication was successful. 
The logon process starts with a user pressing CTRL+ALT+DEL - the secure attention 
sequence (SAS). Winlogon registers this sequence during the boot process and no other process 
can intercept this sequence instead of Winlogon [62]. When Winlogon detects SAS it calls 
GINA to obtain user's credentials. GINA provides interface to get credentials from a user. 
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Default GINA DLL (MSGina.dll ) can be changed with a custom GINA in order to modify the 
standard interactive logon procedure. A custom GINA can, for example, communicate with an 
external device to get user's credentials. If default authentication packages are not able to 
analyze credential information obtained by the custom GINA, then a custom authentication 
package should be used. LSA supports custom authentication packages. The ability to use a 
custom GINA and authentication packages allows to implement virtually any authentication 
scheme. 
Upon obtaining user’s credentials, GINA calls the LsaLogonUser function to 
authenticate a user by using one of the authentication packages. LSA uses specified 
authentication package to authenticate the user. If the logon is local then the local LSA 
authenticates the user, otherwise, in case of the domain logon, the LSA on the domain controller 
does it [64]. Microsoft provides two packages for authentication: MSV1_0 authentication 
package for the local logon and the Kerberos authentication package for the domain logon. The 
MSV1_0 compares user name and hashed password with those stored in the Security Account 
Manager (SAM) database [62]. The MSV1_0 is also used in case of the cached domain logon. 
In this case cached credentials are stored in the LSA database in the encrypted form. MSV1_0 
returns the result of authentication to LSA (that in turn returns it to GINA), and if authentication 
was successful creates a logon session. The Kerberos authentication package operates in 
basically the same manner except that authentication exchange is done via the network and the 
authentication decision is made on the domain controller. 
 In case of successful authentication, LSA checks local policy database for the logon 
rights of the user. If the user does not have appropriate logon rights for the logon method that 
was used, the logon session is terminated and the failure notification is sent to Winlogon [62]. If 
the user has appropriate logon rights then LSA creates access token with appropriate account 
SID, group SIDs, session SID, and a set of privileges retrieved from the LSA policy database. 
LSA returns authentication result to GINA, and GINA returns it to Winlogon. In case of 
successful authentication, Winlogon additionally receives the user's access token. After that 
Winlogon launches user's shell (default is Explorer.exe) and provides it with user's access token 
[63] so that the shell can perform operations on behalf of the user. From the shell other 
processes are created. These processes inherit the user's access token. 
Logon process in Windows Server 2008, Vista, and Windows 7 
The logon architecture in Windows Server 2008, Vista, and Windows 7 was redesigned 
so that GINA is not used. Instead, there is a new Credential Provider model [72]. Moreover, in 
earlier Windows versions a console session (session 0) besides being interactive logon session 
also hosted system processes and services [70]. In the new architecture session 0 became non-
interactive, thus users log on to separate sessions starting from session 1. It means that services 
in session 0 are isolated from user applications. Thus, services that run with higher privileges 
are protected against attacks from a malicious application code [71].  
The new interactive logon architecture includes the following components [73]: 
 Winlogon process 
 Logon user interface (Logon UI) process 
 Credential providers 
 LSA 
 Authentication packages. 
The GINA’s functionality has been devided between Winlogon, Logon UI, and 
credential providers [74]. The Logon UI is responsible for loading the credential providers and 
displaying the Windows logon interface to users. Credential providers gather credentials. 
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Credential Providers are responsible for [73]: 
 describing the credential information required for authentication 
 handling communication and logic with external authentication authorities  
 packaging credentials for interactive and network logon 
They are not security enforcement mechanisms [73]. Security is enforced by LSA and 
authentication packages. Default credential providers support password and smart card 
authentication [72].  Credential providers are implemented as in-process COM objects located 
inside DLLs. They run in the local system context.  
LSA authenticates a user by sending a request to an authentication package. There are six 
authentication packages [75]: 
 Credential Security Support Provider 
 Microsoft Negotiate 
 Microsoft NTLM 
 Microsoft Kerberos 
 Microsoft Digest SSP 
 Secure Channel 
Authentication protocols are responsible for verifying credentials of a user, a computer, or a 
process. The authentication protocols are security support providers (SSPs) that are 
implemented in the form of DLLs [76]. Some protocols are combined into authentication 
packages. 
An application that requests authentication can specify either some specific 
authentication package (used directly if both systems support it) or it can specify Negotiate 
package. Microsoft Negotiate is a security support provider (SSP) that negotiates the best SSP 
for authentication between parties [77] via the Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation 
Mechanism (SPNEGO) [78]. Currently the Negotiate SSP selects between two protocols: 
Kerberos and NTLM [wind auth doc]. If both parties support Kerberos, it is preferred over 
NTLM. The NegoExts (NegoExts.dll) extension to the Negotiate package negotiates the use of 
SSPs other than Kerberos and NTLM [79], for example the Public Key Cryptography Based 
User-to-User (PKU2U) SSP.  
The Credential Security Support Provider protocol (CredSSP) is a SSP that delegates 
credentials for remote authentication. It uses TLS tunnel to transfer credentials. 
The logon process starts when a user enters SAS. After SAS is entered, the Winlogon 
starts the Logon UI to provide the user interface for logon. The Logon UI starts all credential 
providers registered in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion 
\Authentication\Credential Providers. The Logon UI calls credential providers to obtain 
credentials, then it passes these credentials to the Winlogon. It queries every credential provider 
for the number of credentials that provider wants to enumerate and for the number of UI fields 
required to display credentials. The Logon UI displays tiles to the user, after all providers have 
enumerated their tiles. The user chooses a tile and interacts with the credential provider via the 
tile to provide credentials. 
After the credential information has been gathered on the tile, it is packaged into a 
buffer and passed to a calling application [80]. In case of the logon scenario, the Logon UI 
passes credentials to the Winlogon. The Winlogon calls the LsaLookupAuthenticationPackage 
function to get a unique identifier for some authentication package [72]. Then it calls the 
LsaLogonUser function and provides obtained credentials and the authentication package 
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identifier to authenticate the user via the specified authentication package. If authentication was 
successful, LSA checks in the local policy database whether the user has sufficient logon rights. 
Then it creates the access token and returns the authentication result and the access token to the 
Winlogon. If authentication was successful, the Winlogon launches user's shell. 
3.1.3 Smart card logon architecture 
Smart cards provide a two-factor authentication that is based on the possession of a 
smart card and the knowledge of a PIN code. A smart card securely stores a private key and a 
corresponding X.509 certificate with a public key. The private key never leaves the card. 
Besides, it is stored only on the smart card [81]. During authentication, the smart card performs 
cryptographic operations using the private key, thus proving to the authentication server that the 
principal's smart card holds the key.  However, to perform cryptographic operations a user must 
first authenticate to the card. The user proves his identity to the card by presenting a PIN. It 
means that the user is prompted only for the PIN rather than user name, domain name, and 
password during the logon procedure. A workstation interacts with smart cards via smart card 
readers. 
In Windows systems, smart cards can be used to log on only to domain accounts, not 
local accounts [52]. Thus, the standalone smart card logon is not natively supported in Windows 
systems, though there are some commercial products offering this functionality. With the 
domain smart card logon, even in the case of a network service disruption or a failure of the 
domain controller, it is still possible to logon to a workstation that belongs to that domain using 
an offline logon capability. 
Smart card domain logon session for the Windows XP [81]: 
1. A smart card is inserted into a card reader. The insertion of the smart card starts 
the logon process automatically; 
2. The Winlogon calls GINA to obtain user's credentials. GINA presents a logon 
screen to the user. The user is prompted only for a PIN; 
3. GINA sends received PIN to the LSA; 
4. The PIN is used by LSA to access the smart card. 
5. LSA calls Kerberos Authentication Package (Kerberos SSP). Kerberos SSP 
creates a Kerberos Authentication Service Request to the KDC that contains 
principal's certificate and a cryptographic signature generated with the 
corresponding private key for the Kerberos pre-authentication [82]. 
6. The KDC validates the certificate (verifies certification path, checks revocation 
status, etc.) and checks the digital signature. After making these checks KDC 
retrieves user account information from Active Directory. This information is 
used to construct a TGT. Authorization data fields in the TGT contain principal's 
SID, the SIDs for domain groups to which the user belongs, and (in a multi-
domain environment) the SIDs for any universal groups in which the user is a 
member.  The public key from the certifacte is used to encrypt symmetric 
encryption session key. The KDC’s digitally signed response among other things 
contains the TGT, the KDC’s certificate, and the encrypted session key. If the 
client possesses the private key that corresponds to the public key in the 
certificate then he will be able to decrypt the session key and use it for the 
subsequent interactions with KDC. 
7. Upon receival of the response the client validates the KDC certificate and checks 
the digital signature. Using the private key the client can decrypt the session key 
for communication with KDC. In order to log on to the computer the Ticket 
41 
 
Granting Service (TGS) to the local computer must be obtained from KDC. The 
remaining part of the authentication procedure is the same as for a standard 
logon session. 
After a successful domain logon, Windows caches credentials. Thus, it is possible for a 
user to perform local/offline logon to the computer with the domain account even if the domain 
controller or the network connection failed. However, during local smart card logon with 
cached credentials a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) check is not done [83]. 
 
Windows 7, Vista, and Server 2008 Smart Card Infrastructure  
Unlike previous version of Windows, Windows Vista supports [74]: 
 smart cards that contain several (not one as previously) certificates solely for the logon 
purpose, besides certificates for other purposes. The number of certificates that can be 
stored depends on the smart card memory space; 
 changing the PIN and unblocking a smart card without the need to log on first with a 
standard user name and password. 
In order for a smart card to work with Windows, it must have its own Cryptographic 
service provider (CSP) [74]. CSP is a module that performs cryptographic algorithms for 
authentication, encoding, and encryption.  
Figure 3.1.3.1: Windows 7, Server 2008 (R2), and Vista smart card architecture [74, 89] 
Figure 3.1.3.1 depicts the smart card architecture in Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 
(R2), and Windows Vista. The CryptoAPI contains functions that allow applications perform 
authentication, encoding, and encryption. To provide these services CryptoAPI functions use 
CSPs. The second generation of the CryptoAPI is called the Cryptography API: Next 
Generation (CNG). CNG, unlike CryptoAPI, separates cryptographic providers from the key 
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storage providers (KSPs) [90]. KSPs are responsible for managing keys. This includes creating, 
deleting, exporting, importing, and storing of keys. KSPs can also perform asymmetric 
encryption, secret agreement, and signing [90]. All cryptographic algorithms that are supported 
in CryptoAPI 1.0 are also supported in CNG [91]. Besides, CNG supports elliptic curve 
cryptography. CryptoAPI 2.0 provides a superset of CryptoAPI 1.0 that manages X.509 digital 
certificates [92]. 
The Base Cryptographic Provider is a CSP provided by Microsoft that makes it easier to 
write a smart card CSP [74]. It supports data encryption, hashing, and digital signature 
algorithms.  Instead of writing a full propriety CSP, developers can write card-specific modules 
called smart card mini-drivers for the Base CSP. Although the Base CSP with custom smart 
card mini-drivers eases CSP development, it has a major drawback.  Some of the algorithms 
provided by the Base CSP have limitations on the supported key size, and the offered key 
length values are inadequate from the security point of view. For example, the maximum key 
length for the RSA public key exchange algorithm is 512 bit, for the RC2 and the RC4 ciphers 
it is 40 bits (salt length is 88 bits) [93]. Applications built using CryptoAPI or CNG cannot 
change cryptographic algorithms implemented in providers [94]. 
The CNG Smart Card Key Storage Provider is another module that, like the Base CSP, 
is provided by default in Windows. The Smart card KSP, like the Base CSP, utilizes smart card 
mini-drivers. However, in terms of key lengths that are used in cryptographic algorithms [90], 
smart card KSP is not so limited like the Base CSP. RSA smart card mini-drivers can be 
registered with both the Base CSP and the smart card KSP [96]. However, only the smart card 
KSP can work with ECC-only as well as ECC/RSA dual-mode smart cards. To sum up, the 
CNG smart card KSP is a better choice in terms of security and should be preferred over the 
CAPI Base CSP for smart card based logon schemes.  
The smart card KSP and the Base CSP implement commonly needed functionality. If 
developers require some additional functionality, then they should implement their own 
proprietary CSP or KSP. 
A smart card mini-driver “translates the characteristics of particular smart cards into a 
uniform interface that is the same for all smart cards” [96]. The smart card mini-driver interacts 
with a corresponding smart card through the smart card resource manager that provides a 
common interface for communication with various smart card readers. The mini-driver 
emulates the logical card file system and provides a set of primitive capabilities [96] for the 
Base CSP/ KSP.  
The association of the card-specific mini-driver with a smart card is based on the  
Answer-To-Reset (ATR) value that is received from the card [96]. The ATR value should be 
unique for every card. After the system receives ATR from the card, it looks in the registry for 
the ATRs that are stored there to find a match. The registry, actually, besides ATRs keeps also 
ATRMasks. These card-specific values are stored under the  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\Calais\SmartCards registry 
key. During the matching process the system iteratively goes through this registry key and 
applies the ATRMask to the ATR received from the card and compares the result with the ATR 
stored in the registry. 
 For the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) compliant smart cards [95] and for the 
Identity Device with Microsoft Generic Profile (IDMP) compliant smart cards [96] (beginning 
with Windows 7) Microsoft provides an inbox generic class mini-driver [96].  Presence of the 
PIV or IDMP compliant application on the card is used to associate a card with an inbox mini-
driver. If no compatible inbox mini-driver is available, the Windows Plug and Play tries to 
install a smart card mini-driver that is logo-certified through the Windows Logo Program 
(WLP). For the Plug and Play scenario, a unique ID for the smart card must be derived. This 
unique ID is obtained either from the device ID or from the ATR. Thus, ATR is not always used 
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to associate a mini-driver with a smart card. 
When a smart card is inserted into the reader, the following takes place [96]: 
 Smart Card Plug and Play Process: If no compatible inbox mini-driver is 
available, the PNP downloads a logo-certified mini-driver from the Windows 
Update. 
 Winscard Discovery Process: associates a smart card that is installed in the 
system with a PIV- or IDMP-compatible class mini-driver.  
 Windows Smart Card Class Mini-driver Discovery Process: a card mini-driver 
marks the associated card as PIV- or Microsoft IDMP-compatible when the 
smart card is inserted into the reader and the Base CSP/KSP calls 
CardAcquireContext. 
The following table shows AID values that are used in these processes. 
Table 3.1.3.1: AID values [96] 
AID name AID value 
PIV AID A0 00 00 03 08 00 00 10 00 xx yy 
Microsoft (MS) IDMP AID A0 00 00 03 97 42 54 46 59 xx yy 
MS Plug and Play AID A0 00 00 03 97 43 49 44 5F 01 00 
 
The Smart Card Plug and Play process in order to install a smart card mini-driver must 
first derive a unique ID for the smart card. The procedure consists of the following steps 
executed by the PNP: 
1. PNP gets a smart card ATR value that may be used later in ID derivation 
2. It sends a SELECT command to locate the MS Plug and Play AID. 
3. It sends a GET DATA command to get a unique identifier. 
4. If it fails to obtain a unique identifier, it tries to SELECT the PIV AID. The PIV-
compatible device ID or ATR historical bytes are used as a unique ID. 
5. If it fails to SELECT the PIV AID, it tries to SELECT the MS IDMP AID. The 
IDMP-compatible device ID or ATR historical bytes are used as a unique ID. 
6. If PNP fails to select the PIV AID or the MS IDMP AID, it uses ATR historical 
bytes for the unique ID. 
The Windows smart card class mini-driver performs the following steps to mark the card 
as PIV- or Microsoft IDMP-compatible: 
1. It tries to locate the PIV AID by issuing the SELECT command. If the result is 
successful, the card is marked as PIV-compatible. 
2. If it fails to select the PIV AID, it tries to SELECT the IDMP AID. If it succeeds, 
the card is marked as IDMP-compatible. 
3. If it fails to select the IDMP AID, the card is still marked as the IDMP-compatible 
card and the system tries to work with it as if it were the IDMP-compatible card. 
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Smart card logon procedure in Windows 7, Vista, Server 2008 R2 
The logon procedure consists of the following steps [74, 97]: 
1. A smart card insertion does not start the logon. It starts only after SAS is pressed. The 
WinLogon requests the Logon UI to obtain credential information. 
2. The smart card credential provider obtains a list of smart card readers and a list of 
inserted smart cards. For each card, it checks whether the logon certificate is present on 
the card. Found logon certificates are retrieved from the smart card and copied into a 
temporary secure cache. The smart card credential provider provides the Logon UI with 
logon certificates. 
3. The Logon UI displays the logon user interface with found certificate logon tiles to a 
user. The user selects one of the tiles, and a PIN input box is displayed. The entered PIN 
is encrypted by the smart card credential provider. 
4. The smart card credential provider returns the encrypted PIN, user name, etc. to the 
Logon UI. The Logon UI calls the LsaLogonUser function and provides the received 
data to the LSA. 
5. LSA calls the Kerberos Authentication Package (Kerberos SSP) to create a Kerberos 
Authentication Service Request. The remaining part of the Kerberos authentication 
procedure is the same as in Windows XP. 
6. If authentication is successful, then certificates are read from the card (including the root 
certificates) and stored in the user’s certificate store (MYSTORE). 
7. Upon removal of the card, the certificates are removed from the temporary secure cache. 
However, the certificates will still be present in the user’s certificate store (MYSTORE).  
According to [84], Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 have some minor 
enhancements to the smart card platform compared to Windows Vista that are primary related to 
the Plug and Play service and smart card drivers. 
 
3.2 Evaluation of Windows extendibility: custom 
authentication mechanisms 
There are three groups of components in the Windows logon architecture that can be 
customized:  
 End-devices: smart card readers, biometric scanners, USB tokens, etc. 
 Credential providers: password credential provider, smart card credential 
provider, and custom credential providers 
 Authentication packages 
The Winlogon, the Logon UI, and the LSA cannot be modified.  
Optionally architecture can also include Windows services, which manage interaction 
between end-devices and applications/processes, and supporting APIs. For example, both the 
smart card infrastructure and biometric infrastructure have dedicated Windows services: Smart 
card resource manager and Windows Biometric Service respectively. They are responsible for 
tracking and managing all drivers that belong to their specific device group. All communication 
with end-devices goes through these services. These Windows services have supporting APIs 
that provide applications with access to their functionality. 
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Figure 3.2.1: Windows authentication architecture 
According to [85], logon customization is much easier and more secure in the new 
architecture with credential providers than in the old model where custom GINA DLLs had to 
be developed. GINAs required constant updating since each Service pack resulted in its break 
[80]. Previously GINA was responsible for the graphical rendering of the logon interface. In the 
new architecture, this is the responsibility of the Logon UI. The credential provider informs the 
Logon UI which graphical control elements (checkboxes, edit boxes, etc) are required to obtain 
user's credentials. If the Logon UI crashes for some reason, then the Winlogon will simply 
restart it [72]. The risk that the Winlogon will crash because of the bugs in a credential provider 
code is mitigated. Another problem of the old architecture is that a code written for 
authentication at logon did not naturally extend to authentication in Credential UI [80]. 
It is possible to install multiple custom credential providers. Custom credential providers 
can be developed to support different authentication mechanisms. Either a user can decide 
which credential provider to use, or the selection of the credential provider can be event-driven. 
It is possible to make obligatory for all domain users to use a custom logon mechanism [73]. 
Credential Providers can be used for multiple scenarios. They can be designed to 
support Single Sign On (SSO), application-specific credential gathering, authenticating users to 
a secure network access point, and the workstation logon [80].  
Credential providers are quite flexible in terms of supported GUI controls for interaction 
with a user. They can specify (do not render) the usage of the following GUI elements: 
checkboxes, combo boxes, editable text fields, buttons, etc. 
If you only need to extend the credential information that the existing credential 
provider collects, then it is possible to write a credential provider that reuses the functionality of 
the existing credential provider instead of re-implementing it [86]. This process is called 
“wrapping”. Most of the calls are proxied through the existing wrapped credential provider, and 
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the results are returned as if the wrapping credential provider produced them. The calls to the 
introduced extensions should be processed by the wrapping credential provider itself.  
If default authentication packages are not able to analyze credential information 
obtained by a custom credential provider, then a custom authentication package should be used. 
The LSA supports custom authentication packages. The custom security package API supports 
development of custom security support providers for noninteractive authentication, as well as 
custom authentication packages for interactive authentication [87]. The LSA Logon Functions 
are used to access interactive authentication services. For noninteractive authentication services, 
the Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) can be used to directly access services, thus 
bypassing LSA. Every authentication package must implement a specific set of functions that 
LSA calls when it receives authentication requests [88].  
The ability to use custom credential providers and authentication packages allows 
implementing virtually any authentication scheme. 
If we consider some general logon scheme as an extension to the current logon 
infrastructure, then depending on the authentication protocol used we may have one of the 
following scenarios: 
 Neither existing credential providers no existing authentication packages fit our 
needs; 
 The existing credential provider lacks some required functionality (e.g. does not 
collect some information), however an authentication package that implements 
the required authentication protocol already exists; 
 The existing credential provider collects all required credentials and implements 
all required functionality, but there is no authentication package that implements 
the authentication protocol that we need; 
 There is already a credential provider and an authentication package that are 
completely sufficient for us. 
The first scenario requires the most work: both the credential provider and the 
authentication package should be implemented. The second scenario means writing either a 
wrapping credential provider or a completely independent credential provider. The third 
scenario requires implementing of a custom authentication package. The last scenario utilizes 
existing components. However, if the authentication solution utilizes some custom device, then 
a driver for the device should be written. This is also true for all other scenarios. Even if drivers 
already exist for the devices used in the authentication solution, it may happen that they do not 
provide all the functionality needed. Then it would also mean writing device drivers.  
Considering mobile phone based authentication schemes, it is impossible to design a 
credential provider for some generic case that involves all existing and possible mobile phone 
based schemes. Credential providers are task specific. They are designed to work with some 
specific credentials and collect them in some specific way. Although it would be possible to 
write a Windows service that would provide an interface to the credential provider to deal with 
any device that belongs to the “mobile phone device group” in a predefined way, it still would 
not cover all possible variants since we do not know what credentials might be used in the 
future. And even if our mobile phone based generic credential provider would be able to receive 
these credentials, without knowing anything about how the data was obtained from the mobile 
phone, it would not be able to process unknown credentials. The usage of Windows services is 
justified only in frameworks (e.g. biometric framework) that cover many different devices from 
different produces that interact with framework in a predetermined way to provide 
interoperability. And even in the biometric framework there is no “one fits all”  credential 
provider, developers need to develop their own. Only in the smart card architecture we have a 
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credential provider that deals with any smart card that conforms to PC/SC specifications, but 
that is because smart cards function strictly according to these specifications. 
For example, many mobile phones nowadays have a micro-USB connector. Therefore, 
they can be used as USB tokens for some authentication scheme. One could write a credential 
provider and a corresponding Windows service that would track such devices and provide 
interface for the credential provider to access these devices, but it is easier to write an event-
driven credential provider that would react to the insertion of such phone in the computer and 
interact directly with the phone. 
USB and Bluetooth are two communication interfaces that are very common nowadays. 
Almost all mobile phones support Bluetooth, many in addition support micro-USB. Therefore, 
in this paper these connections are considered as primary for mobile phone based 
logon/authentication schemes. It must be noted that USB connection has some obvious 
advantages compared to Bluetooth. First of all, USB connection offers higher security since it is 
almost impossible to eavesdrop data transferred over a short USB cable between the mobile 
phone and the computer. The same is true for man-in-the-middle attacks. Besides, there is no 
need for authentication mechanisms as in Bluetooth, you see where you plug-in the cable. 
Secondly, USB has higher transfer speed. Lastly, USB does not have common radio media 
problems like interference. 
The mobile phone with micro-USB connection can be seen as a USB token. It would be 
possible to write a credential provider that would automatically detect USB insertion, check 
whether it is an appropriate device, and read credential information. Then this credential 
provider would pack credentials for one of the existing authentication packages or for some 
custom authentication package. This case corresponds either to the first or to the second 
extendibility scenario. 
If the mobile phone based authentication scheme relies on smart cards (utilizes the smart 
card inside the phone) and uses existing authentication protocols, then the usage of already 
available smart card infrastructure with the smart card credential provider seems to be a quite 
straightforward choice. This case corresponds to the 4
th
 extendibility scenario when neither a 
custom credential provider nor a custom authentication package need to be implemented. 
Mobile phone in this case acts as a USB or Bluetooth smart card reader depending on the used 
connection. One of the architectures proposed in this thesis follows this scenario. The other 
proposed architecture corresponds to the third scenario in which the custom authentication 
package should be implemented. 
 
3.3 Evaluation of existing mobile phone based authentication 
schemes 
In this section, the existing mobile phone based authentication schemes are described 
and evaluated. In most of these schemes, a mobile network operator (MNO) has a role of an 
identity management (IDM) provider. All of these schemes in one or another way rely on the 
authentication of the phone (UICC) to the MNO. Some of these schemes use only Internet 
channel for authentication, but most of them utilize two channels: the Internet channel and the 
GSM/UMTS channel. 
In authentication schemes that use two devices (in case of logon procedure it is a 
computer and a mobile phone) and multiple channels for authentication protocol exchange (the 
Internet connection from the computer to the authentication server and the GSM/UMTS 
connection from the mobile equipment (ME) to the authentication server) it is crucial to ensure 
that the same user controls both devices [99]. 
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3.3.1 SMS authentication with session-ID check 
A mobile network operator (MNO) has a role of an IDM provider. This authentication scheme 
is based on the fact that a user is already authenticated in the GSM/UMTS network. Therefore, 
the authentication process consists of the steps that ascertain that the owner of the ME is the 
same user that controls the computer. The verification is done by sending a sessionID both to 
the computer over the Internet and to the ME over the GSM/UMTS network. The ME owner or 
the ME itself (automatically) checks that the sessionIDs are the same and sends a confirmation 
message via SMS to the authentication server. The authentication procedure is completed when 
the AS receives the confirmation SMS. 
Figure 3.3.1.1: SMS authentication with sessionID check 
A service provider is a client of the authentication server (AS), it outsources 
authentication to the AS. For MNOs, the HSS (AuC) is the authentication server. 
For automatic verification of sessionIDs by the ME, a Bluetooth connection between the 
computer and the ME is required. 
The described authentication scheme does not provide mutual authentication, it only 
authenticates the user to the service provider. The security of this scheme relies on the security 
of the underlying GSM/UMTS network, and is stronger in case of the UMTS network. This 
scheme does not have any explicit integrity protection. SMS forgery threat is mitigated by the 
GSM/UMTS security mechanisms. However, it is still possible to spoof SMS sender’s address 
[99]. 
The following attack can be easily executed if the attacker controls one of the 
intermediate nodes between the user's computer and the service provider. When the user starts 
authentication to the server provider the attacker also starts authentication (supplying the 
identity of the victim) to the same or the other service provider that uses services of the same 
AS. The attacker blocks the original request from the user so that it does not reach intended 
service provider and responds with a forged Request/identity to the user. When the attacker 
receives sessionID via Internet channel from the AS, he “forwards” it to the victim. The user 
will receive two similar sessionIDs: one forwarded by the attacker via Internet channel and the 
other one sent by AS via SMS. The user (the ME in case of automatic verification) has no way 
to check that the received sessionIDs were actually issued by the AS to provide authentication 
service for the computer with different internet address and possibly for the different service 
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provider. Therefore, the user would issue confirmation SMS, and the AS would reply to the 
service provider that authentication was successful. 
In case of the automatic sessionID verification by the ME using the Bluetooth 
connection to the computer, it is possible for the attacker to authenticate to any service provider 
registered at the AS even without the user noticing it (unless the PIN is required to issue 
confirmation message), if the Bluetooth security is compromised. Though the attacker would 
need to be in the close proximity to launch this attack. 
3.3.2 SIM Strong authentication 
The SIM Strong utilizes the EAP-SIM protocol to provide mutual authentication [100]. 
The MNO has a role of the IDM provider. Thus, the service provider relies on the MNO to 
perform authentication. The EAP-SIM authentication provides higher level of security 
compared to GSM authentication. The EAP-SIM provides the following enhancements to the 
GSM Authentication and Key agreement (AKA) procedure [101]: 
 64-bit long GSM encryption key Kc is used for deriving Master key and is not 
directly used 
 multiple authentication triplets are combined to create authentication responses and 
session keys of greater strength than the individual GSM triplets 
 Transient EAP Keys for protecting EAP-SIM packets, a Master Session Key for link 
layer security, and Extended Master Session Key are derived from the Master key 
EAP-SIM provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and replay 
protection. 
 
Figure 3.3.2.1: EAP-SIM authentication 
The SIM Strong authentication can be performed either via the Internet + Bluetooth 
channel or via the SMS channel with the usage of sessionIDs [100]. In case of the Internet + 
Bluetooth SIM Strong authentication, the ME has the Bluetooth connection with the computer 
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and the EAP-SIM authentication exchange is performed via the Bluetooth channel and the 
Internet channel, the GSM radio channel is not utilized. The complexity and the number of the 
messages in the EAP-SIM exchange makes it unrealistic for the user to perform this exchange 
manually without using Bluetooth. Bluetooth security plays a crucial role in this scheme. By 
compromising the Bluetooth security, an attacker might trick the ME to communicate with 
attacker's computer and authenticate the attacker. 
The SIM Strong authentication that utilizes the SMS channel must also have a 
mechanism to ascertain that the same user controls both the computer and the ME. This is done 
with sessionIDs. A sessionID is generated by the dedicated applet residing on the SIM card 
[99]. The generated sessionID is input by the user in the computer and transferred via Internet 
channel to the AS. Then the applet performs mutual EAP-SIM authentication with the AS over 
the SMS channel. The benefit is that this scheme does not require Bluetooth connection [100]. 
Both types of the SIM Strong authentication require specialized applet on the SIM card 
to perform EAP-SIM [100]. 
EAP-AKA 
EAP-AKA, defined in RFC 5448, is a mechanism for authentication and session key 
distribution that uses an UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism. Unlike 
EAP-SIM that is based on GSM AKA, this authentication protocol is designed to work in 3rd 
generation networks. EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA were developed in parallel; hence, these 
protocols have many common ideas [102]. 
 
Figure 3.3.2.2: EAP-AKA authentication 
Like EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA provides mutual authentication, integrity protection, key 
derivation, confidentiality protection, and optional identity privacy protection. EAP-AKA can 
be used for SIM Strong authentication in the same way as EAP-SIM. 
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3.3.3 One Time Password schemes 
One-Time Password schemes are one of the simplest and most popular forms of two-
factor authentication [104]. They are designed to be immune to the replay attack. Although the 
Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the biometric authentication are considered to be stronger 
than OTP, OTP schemes still provide considerable protection, better than ordinary passwords. 
OTP values should be generated in an unpredictable way, so that it would be impossible 
to derive a new values based on a set of known OTP values. OTP schemes can be classified 
according to the OTP value generation method: 
 S/KEY like methods: this method generates a limited set of one-time passwords 
by performing multiple hashing operations on the initial secret value. The 
security of this scheme is based on the non-reversibility of the hash function.  
 Counter-based: the scheme is based on the ever-increasing counter and a secret 
shared by the token and the AS. RFC 4226 describes a counter-based scheme 
that uses HMAC-SHA-1 function to generate OTP value. HOTP(K, C) = 
Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C)), where K is a shared secret key and C is a 
counter value [104]. Truncation is used to enable the user to easily enter the 
resulting value in computer. It is important for the counter to be synchronized 
between the token used by the user and the authentication server. 
 Time-based: The usage of time as an input parameter to the OTP generator 
ensures that the OTP values do not repeat.  As described in [105], the time-based 
OTP (TOTP) value can be generated by hashing the shared secret and a time 
parameter. Time synchronization is crucial for the TOTP scheme. 
 Challenge-based: The OTP value is generated based on the shared secret and the 
nonce received from the verifier. The verifier generates a random value and 
sends it to the claimant. OATH Challenge-Response Algorithms, described in 
[106], provides one-way or mutual authentication based on the challenge-
response concept. The advantage of this scheme is that parties do not need to 
maintain synchronization of any values. 
 
OTP from PC to SMS 
This scheme is a multi-channel challenge-based OTP authentication system.  It is a one-
way authentication scheme. Only the user is authenticated to the service provider. Figure 3.3.3.1 
depicts the authentication exchange. 
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Figure 3.3.3.1: OTP from PC to phone authentication [99] 
When the client receives a challenge from the AS via the Internet channel he can either 
enter this value to the ME manually, or a Bluetooth connection between the computer and the 
ME can be used to transfer the challenge. The Java MIDlet on the mobile phone communicates 
the challenge to the applet on the SIM card. The applet takes the challenge as an input, 
generates an OTP value, and sends it to the MIDlet. Then, either the user manually creates an 
SMS with generated OTP and sends it to the AS, or the MIDlet can do these steps 
automatically.  
The OTP PC to SMS scheme requires a dedicated OTP generation application on the 
SIM card. By sending the OTP value via GSM/UMTS SMS channel the user assures AS that he 
controls both the computer and the ME. The security is based on the assumption that only the 
legitimate subscriber’s SIM can generate OTP and on the fact that the radio channel is 
encrypted, making it almost impossible to intercept SMS and extract OTP value. 
This scheme provides neither confidentiality protection nor temporal key derivation. 
Besides, since this scheme does not provide mutual authentication and integrity protection it is 
susceptible to many attacks. As in SMS authentication with sessionID check scheme, it is also 
possible to launch session hijacking attack.  This attack can be easily executed if the attacker 
controls one of the intermediate nodes between the user's computer and the service provider. 
When the user starts authentication to the server provider the attacker also starts authentication 
(supplying the identity of the victim) to the same or the other service provider that uses services 
of the same AS. The attacker blocks the original request from the user so that it does not reach 
intended service provider, and responds with a forged Request/identity to the user. When the 
attacker receives a challenge via Internet channel from the AS, he “forwards” it to the victim. 
The user will receive the challenge from the attacker. The computer/user/ME has no way to 
check that the received challenge was actually issued by the AS to provide authentication for 
the user’s session. Believing that this challenge was intended for him the user will unblock OTP 
generation function by supplying the PIN to the ME, the OTP value will be generated and sent 
to AS. AS will check whether the received and self-generated OTP values match and will 
authenticate attacker. 
If a Bluetooth connection is used between the ME and the computer, it should be well 
protected. The attacker can authenticate to any service provider registered at the AS even 
without the user noticing it (unless the PIN is required to issue confirmation message), if the 
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Bluetooth security is compromised. 
OTP from SMS to PC 
Like the architecture with session-IDs, this architecture is based on the fact that a user is 
already authenticated with the GSM/UMTS network. Therefore, the authentication process 
consists of the steps that ascertain that the owner of the ME is the same user that controls the 
computer. 
Figure 3.3.3.2: OTP from SMS to PC authentication [99] 
Since the AS does the check, the user does not have to verify that session-IDs match as 
in the architecture with session-IDs. 
The Authenticator redirects the session to the AS. The AS generates an OTP based on 
the user’s identity by using a hash function. When the user receives an SMS with the OTP from 
the AS, the user enters the OTP value into the browser (can be done automatically via 
Bluetooth). Then the AS verifies whether the received value matches the sent value, 
authenticates the user, and redirects the browser back to the Authenticator.  
The automatic version of this scheme utilizes a Java applet on the computer to get the 
OTP from the SIM via SAP. 
The OTP SMS to PC scheme utilizes the fact that the user is already authenticated in the 
GSM/UMTS network. Thus, the AS needs to confirm that the owner of the ME actually 
controls the computer. This is done with an OTP exchange. Although the OTP value is sent to 
the user’s ME via the SMS channel, it is not used to provide mutual authentication. The only 
difference between the randomly generated sessionID that could be used and the OTP value is 
that the latest is actually associated with the HTTP session created by the user [99]. To do 
session hijacking the attacker needs to send OTP value from his computer. However, the 
attacker cannot intercept this value on the radio channel since this link is protected by 
GSM/UMTS security mechanisms. Only if Bluetooth is used between the ME and the computer 
can the attacker obtain OTP value by compromising the Bluetooth security. Though there is no 
need for the attacker to do this. By intercepting the OTP value, sent back to the AS via Internet 
channel, and sending it from his computer attacker can hijack the session. Since the OTP value 
is bound to the HTTP session, the attacker cannot authenticate to arbitrary service provider if 
the user’s computer performs OTP check. 
If Bluetooth connection is used between the ME and the computer, it should be well 
protected. The attacker can authenticate to any service provider registered at the AS even 
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without the user noticing it (unless the PIN is not asked to authorize the transfer of OTP value 
to the computer), if the Bluetooth security is compromised.  
Session hijacking is possible since this scheme does not provide integrity protection. It 
also does not provide confidentiality protection and temporal key derivation mechanism. 
Enhanced OTP from SMS to PC authentication 
This architecture, described in [103], is an enhanced version of the multi-channel 
challenge-based OTP from SMS to PC solution, which provides integrity protection.  
Figure 3.3.3.3: Enhanced OTP based SMS to PC authentication [103] 
When a user wants to log on to the server, he presents his user name to the Java Servlet 
present on the server. The server generates a challenge and computes an OTP value: OTP = 
hash (challenge || secret key). The message authentication code (MAC) is generated over the 
OTP. Then the challenge and the MAC are sent to the MIDlet via the SMS channel. Upon 
receival of the SMS, the MIDlet in the ME is automatically activated and asks to enter the 
password. The usage of a wireless Messaging API (WMA) enables the MIDlet in the ME to 
send and receive SMS messages. When an application management software (AMS) on the 
mobile phone receives an SMS on the port that the MIDlet is registered with, it delivers it to the 
MIDlet. When the user enters the password, it is hashed and then compared with the stored 
value. If the check succeeds, the password is used to the decrypt the secret key. Then the 
MIDlet generates an OTP value by hashing the received challenge and the secret key. The MAC  
is generated over the OTP and matched with the MAC received via the SMS message. If it is 
different the procedure is aborted. If they match, the MIDlet starts a Bluetooth connection with  
the Java applet on the computer and communicates the OTP value. The OTP value may be 
entered in the computer manually without the usage of Bluetooth, though it should be truncated 
for usability. The applet sends the OTP to the Java servlet via the Internet channel, and the 
Bluetooth connection between the Java MIDlet and the Java applet is aborted. The server 
compares the sent OTP with received OTP and authenticates the user. 
The Java MIDlet allows the mobile phone to act as a token. After the user registers at the 
AS through the Internet, he is able to download the MIDlet. Download is done automatically 
(user’s agreement is required) when the registration is finished. After the MIDlet is installed, 
the key exchange is started between the MIDlet and the AS via the SMS channel. The aim of 
this key exchange is to derive a shared secret key used later for OTP generation. A Simple 
Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) protocol, which is an improved version of 
Diffie-Hellman, is used for the key exchange [103].  
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The server generates an initial OTP and shows it on the web page when the Java MIDlet 
is downloaded. This initial OTP is used during the key exchange to authenticate the key 
exchange [103]. Then a user selects a PIN code for the MIDlet. It is used to provide a two-
factor authentication. 
The Java applet is used to automate the transfer of the OTP from the MIDlet to the 
computer. It registers a Bluetooth server and waits for connections. A 16-byte pass phrase is 
used to protect the Bluetooth pairing. The applet passes received OTP values to the server. 
 The Java servlet represents the AS to the clients. When a user downloads the MIDlet the 
AS initiates the key exchange. The key exchange is performed over the SMS channel. To send 
and receive SMS messages, the servlet uses an SMS gateway. The shared secret key derived 
during the exchange is stored in the AS (along with the user’s profile) and in the mobile phone. 
In the mobile phone, it is stored in the J2ME Record store in the encrypted form. It is encrypted 
with a password that the user selected. In the MIDlet a hash of the user’s password is stored. 
Therefore, the MIDlet can verify the correctness of the password entered by a user.  
It is important to note that the user does not need to prove his identity, though he needs 
to prove that he controls both the computer and the ME. The security relies on the fact that the 
ME with subscriber’s UICC card is already authenticated by the mobile network operator. The 
OTP value that is used as the input to the hash function ensures that the user, with whom the 
key exchange via SMS is performed, is the same user that requested the service from the server 
(it means that the user controls both the computer and the ME). Only the legitimate subscriber 
could receive SMS messages, decrypt them, and compute shared secret K based on the initial 
OTP value and the values sent in SMS. The GSM/UMTS network provides encryption of the 
radio channel and ensures that SMS is forwarded to the destined receiver. 
In the subsequent exchanges the user proves that he controls the computer by sending 
the OTP value, generated by the ME based on the shared secret and the challenge sent via SMS, 
via the Internet channel to the AS. Along with the challenge the MAC value (computed on 
OTP) is sent to the user via the SMS channel. After computing the OTP value, the user can 
check whether the challenge was sent by the party that knows the shared secret key derived 
during the key exchange phase. Only the party that knows shared secret could compute OTP 
value and calculate the MAC value of the OTP. Thus, the user is ensured that the challenge is 
sent by the same server that displayed the initial OTP value on the web page. However, it is still 
not the mutual authentication, since the user does not check the identity of the server when 
making initial HTTP request to the server, thus masquerade attack is possible. The attacker can 
intercept the initial HTTP request, respond with the initial OTP value in the HTTP response to 
the user, go through the key exchange phase and derive the shared secret for OTP generation. 
This scheme provides only integrity protection. The initial OTP value cannot be used to 
authenticate the server (even if it were based on the secret shared by the server and the user) 
since it is transmitted openly to the user, and the attacker can intercept it. 
Since the shared secret for the OTP generation is dynamically derived by the Java 
MIDlet, it is not mandatory for the MNO to act as IDM provider. The server can execute SMS 
exchange with the user directly. The advantage of this scheme is that the dedicated applet on the 
UICC card is not required. However, the shared secret key used for the OTP generation has to 
be stored in the encrypted form in the Java Record Store. 
3.3.4 Summary  
EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA based authentication schemes described in this chapter provide the 
strongest security level. They provide mutual authentication, integrity, confidentiality, replay 
protection, and temporal key derivation. These schemes require special applets on the UICC 
card. The rest of the described schemes provide only one-way authentication. 
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 The enhanced OTP from PC to SMS authentication provides also integrity protection. 
Besides, this scheme is quite flexible. It is very easy to change IDM provider, since there is no 
need for a dedicated applet on the UICC card, OTP generation is done in the ME by the Java 
MIDlet. 
It is possible to enhance all authentication schemes so that they would provide mutual 
authentication and integrity protection. However, this would require subsequent security review 
of the modified schemas by security experts. Thus, EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA based schemas look 
more attractive in this context. 
Both, the SIM Strong authentication based on the EAP-SIM that utilizes SMS channel 
with sessionIDs and the SIM Strong with Bluetooth + Internet channel provide adequate 
security level. In the SIM Strong with Bluetooth + Internet authentication scheme it would be 
unrealistic (from the usability point of view) to perform EAP-SIM exchange without Bluetooth. 
Bluetooth security plays a crucial role in this scheme. Secure dynamic Bluetooth link 
establishment between the ME and the computer can be achieved by using Bluetooth Secure 
Simple Pairing (SSP) with Numeric comparison or Passkey entry association models to 
confirm/authenticate peering. This would allow to avoid a challenging management of PINs 
used in legacy Bluetooth peering schemes. 
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4. Proposed ME-based logon architectures 
In this chapter, proposed mobile phone based logon architectures are described. Both of 
these architectures rely on the ability of smart cards to securely store credentials. The first 
proposed architecture corresponds to the 4
th
 extendibility scenario (described in the previous 
chapter) when neither a custom credential provider nor a custom authentication package needs 
to be implemented. Consequently, we achieve a seamless integration of the proposed solution 
with Windows. The second ME-based logon architecture relies on one-time passwords. It 
corresponds to the third extendibility scenario when an existing credential provider is sufficient, 
but existing authentication packages do not support required authentication algorithm, thus a 
custom authentication package needs to be implemented. 
4.1 Bluetooth smart card reader architecture 
In this architecture, a mobile phone with operator’s UICC emulates a PIV- or an IDMP-
compatible smart card that interacts with a PC/SC smart card reader residing in the computer 
via protected Bluetooth channel. The UICC card contains a Java Card applet that manages a 
public-private key pair. This public-private key pair is used for authentication to the domain 
controller. The protocol for authentication is the Public Key Cryptography for Initial 
Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT). Therefore, a Kerberos infrastructure and an established 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are required to be present in the domain.  
Figure 4.1.1: ME-based logon architecture with a Bluetooth smart card reader server 
The main feature of the proposed architecture is that it can support virtually any 
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authentication scheme that utilizes smart cards.  It can be used not only for the domain logon, 
but also for other purposes like signing documents, e-mails, etc. 
The Windows inbox smart card mini-driver is automatically used in case a mobile phone 
emulates a PIV- or IDMP compatible card. Another alternative would be to create a full 
proprietary smart card mini-driver specially designed for our virtual phone-based card instead 
of emulating PIV or IDMP cards.  
None of the Windows smart card framework elements is changed. A Bluetooth device 
(inbuilt or externally connected) together with the developed Bluetooth smart card reader driver 
acts as an ordinary smart card reader.  The mobile phone emulates a PIV-compatible smart card. 
The default Windows smart card credential provider is responsible for collecting credentials 
from the emulated smart card and a PIN from a user; authentication is handled by the Kerberos 
authentication package. The PIN is used to access operations involving the private key, because 
the Java Card applet residing in the UICC in the mobile phone requires a PIN code to perform 
these operations. 
The Bluetooth connection between the mobile phone and the computer is encrypted and 
authenticated. 
4.1.1 PKINIT 
The PKINIT defines protocol extensions to the Kerberos protocol specifications that 
integrate a public key cryptography into the initial authentication exchange [107]. Addition of 
the public-key cryptography to Kerberos eliminates users’ burden of managing strong 
passwords.   The client and the KDC use public and private key pairs to mutually authenticate 
during the Client – Authentication server exchange and to derive the encryption key to encrypt 
the AS_REPLY. 
The PKINIT exchange consists of the following steps [107]: 
1. The client includes a pre-authentication data element in the initial request to indicate the 
usage of the public-key authentication.  This pre-authentication data element contains 
the client's public-key data and a signature. 
2. The KDC validates the client's X.509 certificate and uses the client's public key to verify 
the signature. If the client’s request is valid, the KDC sends a usual AS_REPLY, but the 
reply is encrypted using one of the following: 
 a key generated through a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange with the client, 
signed using the KDC's signature key 
 a symmetric encryption key, signed using the KDC's signature key and encrypted 
using the client's public key. 
3. The KDC’s reply contains a pre-authentication field with keying material required by 
the client to obtain the encryption key for decrypting the encrypted reply fields. 
4. The client validates the KDC's X.509 certificate and the KDC's signature, obtains the 
encryption key, decrypts the reply, and then proceeds in accordance with the ordinary 
Kerberos protocol. 
 
4.1.2 Description of components 
This section provides a description of implemented components. UML diagrams and 
source code for some of the components are in the Appendix A. The source code for the rest of 
components of this architecture is in the Appendix C: digital attachments. 
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Bluetooth smart card reader driver 
This driver, called BthScrdSrv.sys, is a kernel-mode function driver that acts as a 
Bluetooth L2CAP server (server-side Bluetooth profile driver) and at the same time as an 
ordinary smart card reader driver. It was developed based on two samples from the Windows 
Driver Kit 7600: BthEcho and Pscr. The BthScrdSrv.sys driver is a key element of the 
architecture. The driver declares itself as a member of the smart card reader device group, and it 
advertises its L2CAP-based services via SDP. 
During the installation, the system is searched for the first available local Bluetooth 
radio. If an appropriate device is found, the installation of a local service is triggered. 
As every profile driver, BthScrdSrv uses Bluetooth request blocks (BRBs) to send 
requests to the Bluetooth driver stack. To receive connection notifications from remote devices 
and to be able to build and send BRB requests to accept incoming connections, the driver 
registers a Protocol/Service Multiplexer that L2CAP Bluetooth devices connect to. Then it 
registers itself as a server capable of receiving L2CAP connections. During the L2CAP server 
registration, the driver specifies a callback function that the Bluetooth driver stack calls to 
notify the driver about incoming L2CAP connections. Then it creates a SDP record and adds it 
to the local SDP server. This SDP record contains a list of service classes of which the server is 
an instance. In our case, a unique 128-bit UUID value is used to define it as an instance of the 
“Bluetooth smart card reader” service class, and the pre-allocated UUID-16 0x0100 defines it 
as an L2CAP service. The Java MIDlet in the mobile phone creates a service search pattern 
based on these two UUIDs to find our server. 
The BthScrdSrv registers with the Smart Card Driver Library (Smclib.h). This library 
standardizes most of the smart card reader driver’s functions. It processes most of the I/O 
control (IOCTL) requests that the resource manager sends to the smart card reader driver [108]. 
The driver's DeviceControl routine passes requests received from the system to the smart card 
library. The smart card library automatically completes the calls that do not require interaction 
with the card. If, for example, the resource manager sends the 
IOCTL_SMARTCARD_TRANSMIT request, then this request is forwarded to the smart card 
library that realizes that this request cannot be completed automatically without driver’s 
intervention. Therefore, it calls the driver’s RDF_TRANSMIT callback function that the driver 
registered with the library. This function creates a request for data transmission and sends this 
request to the Bluetooth driver stack, which in turn sends data to the mobile phone. The 
BthScrdSrv’s Bluetooth transmit and receive functions work asynchronously, however the 
Smclib expects synchronous response from the RDF_TRANSMIT callback function. Therefore, 
driver’s transmit function waits for a certain period of time (500 ms) for the response from the 
mobile phone, and if the response does not arrive in time, it responds with a 
STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT to the Smclib. If the answer was received before time-out, the driver’s 
transmit function sends the mobile phone’s response to the Smclib. The smart card library 
completes the IOCTL_SMARTCARD_TRANSMIT request and sends the mobile phone’s 
response to the system.  
When the mobile phone establishes an L2CAP connection with the BthScrdSrv, the 
driver notifies the system that “the card” is inserted. This event makes the system search for an 
appropriate mini-driver. The system sends the APDU command to SELECT the PIV AID. The 
BthScrdSrv transfers this command and any subsequent commands without any modification to 
the mobile phone that emulates the card. When the driver receives a response from the mobile 
phone, it sends it back to the system. 
Java MIDlet L2CAPClient 
This module is responsible for the whole “card emulation logic”, for managing the 
Bluetooth connection with the Bluetooth smart card reader server, and for providing a GUI to 
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the user. The L2CAPClient works as a communicator between the Windows system and the 
Java Card applet. It processes and automatically answers requests that do not require 
involvement of the Java Card applet. Since the Java Card applet understands only a limited set 
of specially crafted commands, the L2CAPClient acts as an interpreter.  It transforms 
commands received from the BthScrdSrv to the form acceptable by the applet and vice versa. 
The L2CAPClient examines the received APDU command, and if the Java Card applet’s 
intervention is required, for example to get the public key or to sign a nonce, then it constructs a 
special APDU command (the one that the Java Card applet knows how to process) and sends it 
to the applet. After the response is received from the applet, the L2CAPClient MIDlet 
constructs an APDU response that Windows expects to receive. 
After the Windows system shows the logon screen, the user has plenty of time to launch 
the L2CAPClient MIDlet and establish a Bluetooth connection, in other words “insert the card”. 
If the user presses SAS before establishing the connection, the smart credential provider will 
tell the Logon UI to show a tile “Insert a card”. When the user launches the MIDlet, the MIDlet 
starts searching for services advertized by the BthScrdSrv. When a device advertizing these 
services is found, the L2CAPClient establishes a connection to the Bluetooth smart card reader 
server and waits for the requests. The communication between them conforms to the request-
response paradigm when the server sends requests and the client satisfies them. The 
communication channel is encrypted and authenticated. 
Java Card applet JCpki 
This Java Card applet resides in the UICC card. It is responsible for creation and 
modification of the public-private key pair. The private key never leaves the applet. All 
sensitive operations like signing or renewal of the public-private key pair are PIN-protected. It 
means that the L2CAPClient must first provide a PIN to the applet to unlock the cryptographic 
functionality. The JCpki applet works with RSA cryptographic algorithms, though it is possible 
to use the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Java Card and Windows support ECC, so if the 
UICC card supports it (some cards do not support all APIs defined in Java Card specifications), 
then it can be used for logon. 
The JCpki applet does not depend on the 3GPP applets (USIM, ISIM, etc.) that reside on 
the card. It does not communicate with them. The Java Card inter-applet firewall ensures that 
there is no interference from other applets. 
For the communication between the MIDlet and the JCpki applet the Security and Trust 
Services API for J2ME (SATSA) - JSR 177 is used. In particular, the SATSA-APDU package 
that is based on Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs) is used. 
Loading and installation of this applet on the UICC should be carried out according to 
GlobalPlatform specifications. The GlobalPlatform’s delegated management with security 
domains allows an application provider to perform loading, installation, and deletion of its 
applications. The issuer of the UICC card should give keys to a security domain that has 
permissions to do these operations. 
4.1.3 Comparison with existing ME-based authentication schemes 
In this section, security issues of the proposed architecture are discussed.  A comparison 
of the proposed “Bluetooth smart card reader with PKINIT” architecture with the SIM Strong 
authentication is made, since the SIM Strong scheme is the strongest among all architectures 
evaluated in the previous chapter.  
Security of the proposed scheme relies on: 
 Security provided by smart cards, which is based on logical and physical security 
mechanisms that form a unified system. Smart cards allow storing information 
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and executing cryptographic protocols in a secure manner. In the context of the 
proposed scheme, this means that the public-private key pair is stored securely, 
and the execution environment for the JCpki’s algorithms is protected. 
 Java Card platform security. Among other things, it provides the transaction 
atomicity and the inter-applet firewall. 
 Security provided by the GlobalPlatform. The GlobalPlatform provides secure 
delegated application management with its security domains. 
 Security provided by Bluetooth. The Bluetooth channel is encrypted and 
mutually authenticated. However, there is no integrity protection and the E0 
stream cipher used for the encryption has some flaws. 
 Security provided by the Kerberos protocol with the PKINIT extension. It 
includes mutual authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection. 
There is one more link that is located in the ME between the L2CAPClient MIDlet and 
the JCpki applet. It does not have any protection, except the fact that the JCpki applet asks for a  
PIN code. Any MIDlet that knows a PIN code can communicate with the JCpki. Risk can be 
mitigated by Java protection domains that determine access to protected functions. A MIDlet 
acquires permissions to perform sensitive operations through the security domain after it is 
installed there. However, modern mobile platforms contain not only the Java virtual machine. 
The threat can come from other applications. Application security is quite important, because 
we do not want some other application to steal the PIN code and make the JCpki perform 
operations involving the private key.  
In comparison with the SIM Strong authentication, based on the EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA, 
the proposed architecture has several advantages. One of the major advantages is that not only 
the mobile network operator (MNO) can be an identity provider. In the SIM Strong 
authentication only the MNO can be an identity provider, since no one else knows GSM/UMTS 
secret keys. Our scheme is MNO independent. In fact, the proposed scheme easily integrates in 
already established enterprise identity management systems where the identity management is 
performed by a company itself. It is designed in a way that it can seamlessly integrate with the 
Active Directory environment. Moreover, any IAM solution that utilizes smart cards for logon 
and authentication can easily use the proposed system, because it is not limited to Kerberos as 
an authentication protocol. It can work with any authentication scheme that utilizes smart cards. 
In the proposed architecture, there is no need for all users in a company to have 
subscription to only one mobile operator to make the scheme work as in the SIM Strong’s case. 
Users can continue using their own subscriptions, unless the UICC does not support the Java 
Card technology or the GlobalPlatform application management framework, or the MNO does 
not allow installing additional applets. A company would need to have a contract with MNO for 
the UICC applet management. 
The SIM Strong authentication requires constantly available external Internet channel 
towards the MNO. If the external Internet channel goes down, the MNO becomes inaccessible 
and no authentication exchange can be made. The proposed solution does not have such 
requirement. It is assumed that the authentication server would be located inside of the 
company’s perimeter, though no limitations are set.  
  The SIM Strong authentication that utilizes the Internet+Bluetooth channel is quite 
similar to our architecture in terms of communication channels. Bluetooth security is crucial in 
both the SIM Strong scheme and in our scheme, and it is well known that it has some flaws. 
However, a slightly different variant of the proposed scheme that utilizes a USB connection 
instead of Bluetooth could mitigate many risks (the same is true for the SIM Strong). It is 
possible to write either a kernel-mode or a user-mode USB smart card reader driver that would 
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work with mobile phones. 
The other SIM Strong scheme that uses sessionIDs and the SMS channel can be used 
without Bluetooth. However, this scheme requires available radio connection with the mobile 
network. It could be a problem in some premises (e.g. inside of industry buildings). Besides, if 
the GSM network is used instead of UMTS, there can be some security issues. 
Both the SIM Strong schemes and the “Bluetooth smart card reader with PKINIT” 
require specialized application on the UICC card. In the SIM Strong solution, this application is 
responsible for the EAP-SIM/AKA exchange, and in the proposed solution it is responsible for 
the operations with the public-private key pair. Both schemes are highly secure and provide 
mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection on the link between the 
computer and the authentication server. The Bluetooth connection is identical in both schemes. 
To make the Windows logon work with the SIM Strong authentication would require 
changing several Windows components. Although Windows supports EAP framework, it does 
not use EAP protocols for user logon. It uses it with other networking components to provide 
network access protection. None of the authentication packages provided by Microsoft has the 
EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA support. It means that in order to use the SIM Strong authentication for 
the logon, one would first need to implement an authentication package that supports the EAP-
SIM/EAP-AKA authentication protocol. Besides, a custom credential provider should be 
implemented to work with the SIM Strong credentials. A credential provider for the SIM Strong 
authentication that utilizes Internet+Bluetooth channel would be different from the credential 
provider for the SIM Strong authentication that uses sessionIDs and the SMS channel. For the 
Bluetooth communication, a Bluetooth server module would be required on the Windows 
system. It could be implemented as a kernel-mode or a user-mode driver that acts as a Bluetooth 
L2CAP/RFCOMM server. The SIM Strong authentication that uses sessionIDs and the SMS 
channel would not need this module, unless Bluetooth would be used to communicate 
sessionIDs to the computer. Therefore, compared to the proposed solution the SIM Strong 
integration into the Windows logon would require much more effort. 
The proposed solution and the SIM Strong schemes provide approximately the same 
level of security, but I consider the “Bluetooth smart card reader with PKINIT” architecture to 
be more flexible because of the reasons discussed above.  
 
 
4.2 OTP-based logon architecture 
A proposed OTP-based authentication scheme provides mutual authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection relying on the OTP Kerberos protocol [109]. A 
UICC card contains a dedicated Java Card applet that generates an OTP value. The OTP is 
generated based on a 256-bit secret key, shared with the authentication server, and a time 
parameter (a counter and a challenge variants are also possible). The generated OTP value is 
entered by a user into the computer, where it is used for the Kerberos OTP authentication. The 
default password credential provider collects credentials entered by the user. However, a custom 
authentication package that supports OTP Kerberos is required.  
The authentication procedure can be described as follows. A user starts the Java MIDlet 
on the ME and provides a PIN code to unlock the UICC Java applet OTP generator. The MIDlet 
provides the applet with the time parameter to generate a time-based OTP (TOTP). The 
generated TOTP value is shown on the ME’s screen. The user inputs his user name and 
password into the computer. The standard password credential provider collects these 
credentials, packs them for the Kerberos authentication protocol and gives to the Logon UI. 
Eventually the LSA submits these credentials to the custom OTP Kerberos authentication 
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package. The computer starts Kerberos authentication with the KDC.  
The following figure depicts the TOTP Kerberos mobile phone based logon architecture. 
Figure 4.2.1: TOTP Kerberos mobile phone based logon architecture 
4.2.1 OTP Kerberos 
The OTP Kerberos is not a new version of the Kerberos protocol. It is a Kerberos v5 
protocol that allows OTP values to be used in the pre-authentication exchange. OTP Kerberos is 
designed to work with time-based, counter-based, and challenge-response based OTP systems. 
A Kerberos 4-pass variant is used when the challenge from the server is required, otherwise a 2-
pass variant that relies on timestamps/counters is used. In both variants, a client has to generate 
an OTP response and two secret keys: a Reply Key - to decrypt KDC's reply and a Client key to 
encrypt messages sent to the KDC. 
When a user enters a password, a workstation generates a master key by hashing this 
password. Then the KDC sends a session key to the workstation. This session key is encrypted 
with the master key. However, since it is an OTP scheme, we have weak passwords (6 - 8 digit 
value). Consequently, a simple attack can be used to get the session key by trying all master 
keys (10^6 – 10^8). Therefore, a secure tunnel is needed. The inner authentication should be 
bound to the outer secure tunnel in a way that the inner authentication will not be performed 
without available and working outer tunnel. These all features are already done in the Flexible 
authentication secure tunneling (FAST) protocol. 
The Flexible authentication secure tunneling (FAST) protocol, described in [110], 
provides a protected channel between the user and the KDC. FAST extends the Kerberos 
protocol with pre-authentication mechanisms (OTP in our case) by encapsulating the pre-
authentication mechanism in FAST messages. FAST does not authenticate the client or the 
KDC (though FAST allows to optionally authenticate the KDC to the client); it provides a 
protected tunnel for the pre-authentication data transfer. 
FAST uses so-called armoring schemes. The armor scheme must provide a fresh armor 
key for each conversation. The armor key is used to encrypt the pre-authentication data in the 
subsequent message exchange. For example, a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) obtained by the 
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user's machine using the host keys to pre-authenticate with the KDC can be used as an armor 
ticket, or the client can utilize anonymous PKINIT to obtain an anonymous TGT as the armor 
ticket and optionally authenticate the KDC [110]. These two schemes are ticket-based armor 
schemes. For these schemes, the armor ticket is used in the derivation of the armor key. 
The armor key is used to protect the pre-authentication exchange. It is also used in the 
derivation of the Client and the Reply keys, in order to bind the outer FAST tunnel to the inner 
encryption. This is done to mitigate some man-in-the-middle attacks [109]. 
4-pass system 
The client sends an initial AS-REQ. If the OTP authentication is required, the KDC 
answers with a KRB-ERROR message containing a PA-OTP-CHALLENGE in the FAST 
protected data. The PA-OTP-CHALLENGE contains a KDC generated nonce and some other 
optional values. Upon receiving the challenge, the client generates an OTP value and derives 
the Client and the Reply keys from the Armor Key and the OTP value. A token can generate the 
OTP value based on the challenge generated by the KDC, token's current state (e.g. time), or a 
combination of these two [109]. The generated Client Key is used to encrypt the nonce received 
from the KDC. Then the client generates its own nonce and sends it along with the encrypted 
nonce (the nonce received from the KDC and encrypted with the Client key) to the KDC in the 
FAST protected data filed of the AS-REQ message. On receipt, the server generates encryption 
keys from the OTP value and the armor key, and authenticates the client decrypting the nonce 
encrypted by the client and checking it. The server responds with the AS-REP that contains the 
client’s nonce encrypted with the Reply key in the FAST protected data. 
Figure 4.2.1.1 depicts the 4-pass pre-authentication. 
 
Figure 4.2.1.1: OTP Kerberos 4-pass pre-authentication 
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The steps involved in the Kerberos 4-pass pre-authentication are the following [103]: 
 The user enters the username in the computer/client; 
 The client sends the initial AS-REQ with the user’s name and realm to the KDC; 
 The KDC determines that the OTP authentication is required for the user; 
 The KDC replies with the KRB-ERROR message that contains the challenge/nonce. 
The message is protected by the FAST encryption; 
 The computer asks the user to enter the OTP value or connect the token to the 
computer in order to retrieve the OTP value. The OTP value can be generated based 
on the challenge generated by the KDC, token's current state (e.g. time), or a 
combination of these two.  
 The generated OTP value and the armor key are used to derive the Client and the 
Reply encryption keys. The generated Client Key is used to encrypt the s_nonce 
received from the KDC.  
 Then the client generates its own c_nonce and sends it along with the encrypted 
s_nonce (the nonce received from the KDC and encrypted with the Client key) to the 
KDC in the FAST protected data filed of the AS-REQ message. 
 The KDC generates the OTP value for the user based on the identity from the AS-
REQ message. Then the KDC derives encryption keys and authenticates the client 
decrypting the s_nonce encrypted by the client and checking it. 
 The KDC constructs a TGT for the user 
 The KDC responds with the AS-REP that contains the TGT and the client’s c_nonce 
encrypted with the Reply key in the FAST protected data. 
 The client authenticates the KDC 
2-pass system 
This scheme can be used if the client knows that the KDC supports the OTP pre-
authentication. The client derives the Client and the Reply key from the armor key and the OTP 
value, and encrypts a timestamp with the derived Client key. Then the client generates the 
nonce that will be used to authenticate the KDC. Then the client includes the encrypted 
timestamp and the generated nonce to the PA-OTP-REQUEST (FAST protected) in the initial 
AS-REQ. On receipt, the server generates encryption keys from the OTP value and the armor 
key, and authenticates the client decrypting the timestamp encrypted by the client and checking 
it. The server responds with the AS-REP that contains the client’s nonce encrypted with the 
Reply key in the FAST protected data. 
Figure 4.2.1.2 shows the 2-pass pre-authentication exchange. 
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Figure 4.2.1.2: OTP Kerberos 2-pass pre-authentication 
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the mobile phone based logon architecture. 
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Moreover, there are special cryptographic requirements for the length of the nonce. It is not 
secure to use a short nonce. According to [109], the nonce should be “as long as the longest key 
length of the symmetric key types that the KDC supports and MUST be chosen randomly”. 
Since challenges have considerable length, a user cannot read them from a screen and manually 
input them into the mobile phone. Therefore, a USB or a Bluetooth connection should be used. 
And this requires implementing an additional component responsible for this in Windows. That 
is why the 4-pass system with OTPs derived from time seems to be more appropriate. It can 
work with the default password credential provider; and a user can simply type in the generated 
OTP into the computer. 
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4.2.2 Description of components 
This section provides a description of implemented components. UML diagrams and 
source code for some of the components are in the Appendix B. The source code for the rest of 
components of this architecture is in the Appendix C: digital attachments. 
Java TOTPClient 
A mobile phone with a dedicated application on the UICC card acts as a token. The 
mobile phone contains a Java MIDlet, called TOTPClient, responsible for the authentication 
logic on the ME and interaction with a user. The TOTPClient simply uses the UICC Java Card 
applet JCtotp to generate a TOTP. 
For the communication between the MIDlet and the Java Card applet the Security and 
Trust Services API for J2ME (SATSA) - JSR 177 is used. In particular, the SATSA-APDU 
package that is based on Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs) is used. 
JCtotp applet 
The UICC Java Card applet, called JCtotp, is responsible for the OTP generation based 
on a time parameter and a 256-bit secret key shared by the Java applet and the authentication 
server. The secret key is loaded to the card (along with initial PIN) during applet 
loading/installation. The shared key never leaves the applet. To generate an OTP value a user 
would need to unlock the applet’s OTP generation function by entering a PIN code. The OTP 
schema can be a HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm (HOTP) [104] based on 
counters, or a Time-based One-time Password Algorithm (TOTP) [105]. In this thesis, the 
TOTP based schema was implemented. 
For the TOTP schema to work the mobile phone should synchronize a clock with the 
authentication server. The MNO could provide a time synchronization service for the 
authentication server and the mobile phone. The authentication server would actually be able to 
use any internet time server. Users also could manually synchronize time in their mobile phones 
with “company’s time”, though this solution is not quite user friendly. 
Since the Bluetooth connection is not used, the generated OTP value is truncated to 
provide better usability. It is truncated according to the RFC 4226 that describes a counter-
based scheme, which uses HMAC-SHA-1 function to generate an OTP value. The time-based 
OTP value is obtained by replacing the counter with time in this function [105]. The OTP value 
is generated as: TOTP(K, time) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K, time)), where K is a shared 
secret key.  
The JCtotp applet does not depend on the 3GPP applets (USIM, ISIM, etc.) that reside 
on the card. It does not communicate with them. The Java Card inter-applet firewall ensures 
that there is no interference from other applets. 
We assume that the UICC card supports the Java Card technology and the 
GlobalPlatform application management framework. The Java Card security mechanisms 
protect the OTP generation applet. The GlobalPlatform allows delegating application 
management, so that an actual application provider/service provider will be responsible for 
management of its application and not a mobile network operator that owns the card. Besides, 
the GlobalPlatform allows the application provider to securely load/change shared secret keys. 
The issuer of the UICC card should give keys to a security domain that has permissions to do 
all these operations. 
Kerberos-FAST SSP 
This custom authentication package should implement a FAST extension to the 
Kerberos protocol according to the 4-pass scheme with OTP values derived from time. 
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4.2.3 Comparison with existing ME-based authentication schemes 
The security of this scheme is based on the assumption that only a user who possesses 
the ME with the UICC card, which contains an applet that holds the secret key, is able to 
generate a valid OTP. 
Security of the proposed scheme relies on: 
 Security provided by smart cards, which is based on logical and physical security 
mechanisms that form a unified system. Smart cards allow storing information 
and executing cryptographic protocols in a secure manner. In the context of the 
proposed scheme, it means that the public-private key pair is stored securely, and 
the execution environment for the JCtotp’s algorithms is protected. 
 Java Card platform security. Among other things, it provides the transaction 
atomicity and the inter-applet firewall. 
 Security provided by the GlobalPlatform. The GlobalPlatform provides secure 
delegated application management with its security domains. 
 Security provided by the Kerberos protocol. It includes mutual authentication, 
integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection. 
All application security considerations for the mobile phone that apply to the Bluetooth 
smart card reader architecture also apply to this architecture.  
In comparison with the SIM Strong authentication based on the EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA 
the proposed architecture has several advantages. One of the major advantages is that not only 
the mobile network operator (MNO) can be an identity provider. In the SIM Strong 
authentication only the MNO can be an identity provider, since no one else knows GSM/UMTS 
secret keys. Our scheme is MNO independent. There is no need for all users of a company to 
have subscription to only one mobile operator to make the scheme work as in the SIM Strong’s 
case. Users can continue using their own subscriptions, unless the UICC does not support the 
Java Card technology or the GlobalPlatform application management framework, or the MNO 
does not allow installing additional applets. A company would need to have a contract with 
theMNO for the UICC applet management. 
The SIM Strong authentication requires constantly available external Internet channel 
towards the MNO. If the external Internet channel goes down, the MNO becomes inaccessible 
and no authentication exchange can be made. The proposed solution does not have such 
requirement. It is assumed that the authentication server would be located inside of the 
company’s perimeter, though no limitations are set. 
Both the SIM Strong scheme and the TOTP Kerberos ME-based scheme require 
specialized application on the UICC card. In the SIM Strong solution, this application is 
responsible for the EAP-SIM/AKA exchange, and in the proposed solution it is responsible for 
the OTP generation. 
The SIM Strong authentication that utilizes Internet+Bluetooth cannot work without 
Bluetooth connection (USB connection could be used), since it is unfeasible to make the EAP-
SIM/AKA exchange manually. And it is well-known that Bluetooth has some security issues 
[60, 98]. On the other hand, the SIM Strong with sessionIDs and the SMS channel can be used 
without Bluetooth. However, this scheme requires available radio connection with the mobile 
network. It could be a problem in some premises (e.g. inside of industry buildings). 
The proposed TOTP Kerberos ME-based logon architecture provides a high security 
level, since it relies on the security of the industry standard protocols and technologies such as 
Kerberos, GlobalPlatform, and Java Card. As an OTP generation algorithm a time-based OTP 
scheme that is currently an IETF Internet-draft is used. Smart card security mechanisms provide 
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physical and logical security, thus ensuring protection for the OTP generation algorithm. Since 
the authentication procedure does not rely on the GSM/UMTS subscription secrets, the 
proposed architecture provides flexibility by allowing a company to do identity management 
itself. The widespread usage of the Kerberos protocol would allow an easy transition to the new 
authentication scheme. Since only the thoroughly studied technologies are used in the proposed 
architecture, security risks are mitigated. 
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5. Conclusions 
This master’s thesis has proposed two novel Windows workstation logon schemes that 
use a mobile phone with a UICC card for authentication. The proposed schemes allow users 
registered in the domain to log on to their workstations.  The thesis also studies how new 
phone-based authentication schemes can be integrated into the Windows logon architecture. 
5.1 Results and achievements 
The first scheme emulates a smart card reader and a smart card in order to interoperate 
with the Windows smart card framework to provide PKI-based logon. The mobile phone with 
the UICC card emulates a smart card that communicates with the emulated smart card reader 
via protected Bluetooth channel. To emulate the Bluetooth smart card reader only a Bluetooth 
adapter (in-built or externally connected) is required. The Bluetooth connection is encrypted 
and authenticated. Neither the phone nor the UICC can emulate the smart card on its own. The 
UICC card is responsible for the secure storage of the public-private key pair and for the secure 
execution of cryptographic algorithms. This ensures high security of the proposed solution. 
The advantages of the Bluetooth smart card reader architecture are as follows. It 
provides a two-factor authentication: the ownership of the phone and a PIN to access the UICC. 
Unlike many solutions available on the market, it is not a “soft token”. All secrets are stored on 
the real smart card (UICC) and not on the phone itself. Therefore, the phone is a secure and 
tamper-resistant token. 
The solution reuses available smart card infrastructure as much as possible, both in 
terms of software and hardware. It requires only a Bluetooth adapter. No change is required to 
the domain infrastructure. Therefore, a seamless integration with Active Directory and Window 
server is achieved. Identity management is done with the same tools as for the real smart cards. 
This solution can work with any authentication scheme used with real smart cards.  
Since a smart card reader is emulated, the proposed solution can be used not only for the logon 
but also for all other functions typically done with smart cards (e.g. signing of documents, e-
mails). 
The Bluetooth smart card reader architecture is mobile network operator independent. It 
does not depend on the GSM/UMTS secrets. Users can use their existing subscriptions, if a 
mobile network operator allows delegated management according to the GlobalPlatform 
specifications. Besides, the proposed scheme does not need the GSM/UMTS radio network 
connection as many other schemes that use mobile phones for authentication. 
Although the Windows system really sees the Bluetooth adapter as a fully functional 
smart card reader and the secure Bluetooth communication was achieved between the phone 
and the reader, because of the lack of time the module responsible for processing commands 
sent to the emulated card can process only several commands. Therefore, the complete 
authentication procedure was not achieved. However, it was shown that the idea is working. 
In the second scheme, the mobile phone with the UICC card serves as a token for 
generating OTP values based on a shared secret key and the time parameter. The UICC card is 
responsible for the secure storage of the shared secret key and for the secure execution of the 
OTP generation algorithm. This ensures high security of the proposed solution. This thesis 
concentrates on the first authentication scheme, therefore the second scheme is described in 
addition. Only the client’s part of the OTP-based scheme was developed. 
The thesis also studies how new authentication schemes in general and those that work 
with mobile phones in particular can be integrated into the Windows logon system.  A 
conclusion is made that it is impossible to make a generic architecture that would easily support 
all existing and possible future mobile phone authentication schemes for the Windows logon. 
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Windows is already a highly customizable environment and can support virtually any 
authentication scheme for the logon, though a considerable amount of modifications may be 
required to implement a particular scheme. 
All authentication schemes can be placed to one of four groups according to the amount 
of modifications required to be done to the Windows system. The evaluation of the difficulty 
level for each of the groups is made. As an example, the SIM Strong architecture is evaluated 
according to this scheme. It is shown that the SIM Strong, as well as the rest of evaluated 
phone-based architectures, requires changing several Windows components (quite a demanding 
task) in order to be used for the workstation logon. 
5.2 Discussions and future work 
Both of the proposed architectures rely on the UICC card as a security element. 
However, since secret keys for the UICC’s security domains were not available, the developed 
Java Card applets were tested only in the development kit simulation environment. There was 
no possibility to make it with real cards. Therefore, both solutions should be tested with real 
cards. 
The key element of the Bluetooth smart card reader architecture – the driver has been 
fully implemented. It was tested on Windows 7. Although there should be no problems in using 
it on Windows Vista or XP, these tests are still to be done. The Bluetooth smart card reader 
driver securely and properly transmits all received APDUs in both directions, however because 
of the lack of time the L2CAPClient MIDlet, which is responsible for the card emulation logic, 
has limited APDU processing capabilities. It can process only simple commands like selecting 
applet. This drawback does not allow showing a fully functional logon procedure. However, 
there should not be any difficulties to make this module fully functional. 
The main feature of the proposed Bluetooth smart card reader architecture is that it can 
support virtually any authentication scheme and application that utilizes smart cards. Therefore, 
in the future work we would like to try it in such widespread operations as signing documents, 
e-mails, etc. 
The proposed Bluetooth smart card reader architecture utilizes Bluetooth for 
communication between the phone and the computer. However, the Bluetooth encryption 
algorithm has some security flaws [60], and is not considered very strong [98]. On the other 
hand, the USB connection offers higher security since it is almost impossible to eavesdrop data 
transferred over a short USB cable between the mobile phone and the computer. Besides, there 
is no need for authentication mechanisms, because you see where you plug-in the cable. In 
addition, USB has higher data transfer speed and does not have radio media problems such as 
interference. Since Windows already has a standard USB smart card reader driver, only the 
mobile phone part would need to be changed (though, a smart card mini-driver may also be 
required).  In particular, a module that manages a USB connection should be implemented. 
Nowadays, not all phones are equipped with USB ports, but in the nearest feature, it will be on 
every phone because the Micro-USB was accepted as a common universal charging interface by 
leading phone producers. 
This thesis primary concentrates on the Bluetooth smart card reader architecture and its 
implementation. Therefore, not so much time was devoted to the second proposed architecture. 
In the second OTP-based proposed architecture only the mobile phone part was implemented 
(the Java MIDlet and the Java Card applet). There was not enough time to implement the 
Kerberos-FAST authentication package. There is a possibility to use the IPSec protection 
instead of the FAST tunnel to provide an encrypted outer tunnel for Kerberos. Then, the default 
Kerberos authentication package may be used. However, a thorough analysis is required to 
understand whether this substitution with IPSec will not dramatically decrease the overall 
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security. The Active Directory does not have native support for one-time passwords. So, some 
external servers may be required to make OTP schemes work in Windows domains. Therefore, 
this question requires more careful investigation. 
The proposed architectures rely on the ability of smart cards to securely store data and 
perform cryptographic operations. However, it would be much easier if mobile phone platforms 
provided similar services. The idea is to study how mobile phone platforms can provide secure 
storage and protected execution environment without relying on smart cards.  
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7. Appendix A: source code for the Bluetooth smart 
card reader architecture 
This section contains UML 2.1 diagrams for the L2CAPClient MIDlet and the source 
code for JCpki applet from the Bluetooth smart card reader architecture. The source code of the 
driver itself and of the L2CAPClient MIDlet is on the enclosed CD. 
7.1 L2CAPClient UML diagrams 
The following picture depicts the Java L2CAPClient MIDlet class diagram. 
Figure 7.1.1: L2CAPClient class diagram 
The detailed description of these classes is provided below. 
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+ DiscoveryManager (Monitor)
+ performServiceSearch (UUID[]) : void
+ deviceDiscovered (RemoteDevice, DeviceClass) : 
void
+ inquiryCompleted (int) : void
-  searchServices (UUID[]) : void
+ servicesDiscovered (int, ServiceRecord[]) : void
+ serviceSearchCompleted (int, int) : void
-  boss: Monitor
-  discoveryAgent: DiscoveryAgent
-  localDevice: LocalDevice
-  servicesList: UUID ([])
-  serviceRecord: ServiceRecord ([])
-  remoteBthDevices: Vector
DiscoveryManager
DiscoveryListener
+  CardCommunicator(APDUConnection)
+  sign(byte[]) : byte[]
+  updateKeys() : boolean
+  verifyPIN(String) : boolean
+  updatePIN(String) : boolean
+  updatePIN(byte[]) : boolean
-   makePinApdu(byte, String) : byte[]
-   makePinApdu(byte, byte[]) : byte[]
-   makeSignatureApdu(byte[]) : byte[]
-  cardConnection: APDUConnection
~  SW_NO_ERROR: byte ([]) {readOnly}
~  INS_VERIFY_PIN: byte {readOnly}
~  INS_CHANGE_PIN: byte {readOnly}
CardCommunicator
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Figure 7.1.2: L2CAPClient classes 
 
7.2 JCpki Java Card applet’s source code 
The following section contains the JCpki Java Card applet’s source code. 
 
  1 /* 
  2  * Copyright (c) 2010 NTNU/KTH author: Oleksandr Bodriagov 
  3  
  4  * JCpki.java    15/04/2010 
  5  * This applet manages RSA public-private key pair and signs data according to sha-        
1WithRSAEncryption algorithm.   
  6  * !Cryptographic operations may not be fully supported in some simulators 
  7  */ 
  8  package pki; 
  9  
 10  import javacard.framework.APDU; 
 11  import javacard.framework.ISO7816; 
+  <<constructor>> L2CAPClient()
+  startApp() : void
+  pauseApp() : void
+  destroyApp(boolean) : void
+  commandAction(Command, Displayable) : void
+  commandAction(Command, Item) : void
+  run() : void
+  srvScanCompleted(ServiceRecord[]) : void
-  startBthConnection(String) : void
+  errorInform(String) : void
+  receivedData(byte[], int) : void
+  getHex(byte[], int) : String
-  GUI elements: Forms, TextFields, Commands
-  appletAID: String {readOnly}
-  BTHSCRD_UUID: String {readOnly}
-  serviceRecord: ServiceRecord ([])
-  servicesList: UUID ([])
-  cardConnection: APDUConnection
-  L2conn: L2CAPConnection
-  apduProcessor: ApduProcessor
-  cardCommunicator: CardCommunicator
-  dataReceiver: Receiver
-  serviceLocator: DiscoveryManager
L2CAPClient
MIDlet
CommandListener
ItemCommandListener
Runnable
+  Receiver (Monitor, L2CAPConnection)
+  run() : void
+  start() : void
+  stop() : void
-   boss: Monitor
-   connection: L2CAPConnection
-   incomingData: byte ([])
Receiver
Runnable
<<interface>>
Monitor
+ srvScanCompleted(ServiceRecord[]) : 
void
+  errorInform(String) : void
+  receivedData(byte[], int) : void
+  ApduProcessor (CardCommunicator)
+  processApdu (byte[], int) : byte[]
-   smartCard: CardCommunicator
~  IDMP_AID: String {readOnly}
~  PIV_AID: String  {readOnly}
~  ANSWER_TO_RESET: byte ([])
~  CLA_ISO7816: byte  {readOnly}
~  INS_SELECT: byte {readOnly}
~  INS_GET_DATA1: byte {readOnly}
~  INS_RESET: byte {readOnly}
ApduProcessor
. . .
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 12  import javacard.framework.ISOException; 
 13  import javacard.framework.Applet; 
 14  import javacard.framework.OwnerPIN; 
 15  import javacard.framework.JCSystem; 
 16  import javacard.framework.Util; 
 17  import javacard.security.*; 
 18  
 19 public class JCpki extends Applet 
 20 { 
 21     final static byte VERIFY_PIN = (byte) 0x20; // INS value for ISO 7816-4 VERIFY 
 22     final static byte UPDATE_PIN = (byte) 0x57; // INS value for update PIN request 
 23     final static byte SIGN = (byte) 0x59; // INS value for the Signature operation 
 24     final static byte GET_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = (byte) 0x54; // INS value 
 25     final static byte GET_PUBLIC_MODULUS = (byte) 0x55; // INS value    
 26     final static byte UPDATE_KEYS = (byte) 0x46; // INS ISO GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR 
 27     final static byte [] SW_NO_ERROR = {(byte)0x90,(byte)0x00}; 
 28  
 29     final static byte TryLimit = (byte) 4;// number of tries for PIN 
 30     final static byte MaxPINSize = (byte) 8; 
 31     private KeyPair rsaPair; 
 32     private OwnerPIN appletPIN; 
 33     private RSAPrivateKey rsaPrivateKey;  
 34     private RSAPublicKey rsaPublicKey; 
 35     private Signature mSignature; 
 36      
 37     private short dataLength;  
 38     private byte[] signedbuffer; //array for storing signed data 
 39     private short signatureLength; 
 40           
 41     // Constructor. Only this class's install method should create the applet object. 
 42     protected JCpki(byte[] installParameters, short offset, byte length) 
 43     { 
 44         byte [] initialPIN = new byte[4]; 
 45         short pinOffset = offset;         
 46          
 47         Util.arrayCopy(installParameters, (short)(pinOffset), initialPIN,(short)0 , (short)4); 
 48         appletPIN = new OwnerPIN(TryLimit, MaxPINSize); 
 49         appletPIN.update(initialPIN, (short) 0,(byte) 4); 
 50          
 51         //generate public-private key pair; simulator supports only 512-bit key 
 52         //rsaPair = new KeyPair( KeyPair.ALG_RSA, KeyBuilder.LENGTH_RSA_2048 ); 
 53         rsaPair = new KeyPair( KeyPair.ALG_RSA, (short)512 ); 
 54         rsaPair.genKeyPair(); 
 55         rsaPublicKey = (RSAPublicKey) rsaPair.getPublic(); 
 56         rsaPrivateKey = (RSAPrivateKey) rsaPair.getPrivate(); 
 57  
 58         //initialize signature 
 59         mSignature = Signature.getInstance(Signature.ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1, false); 
 60         mSignature.init(rsaPrivateKey, Signature.MODE_SIGN); 
 61          
 62         //the buffer is cleared when applet is deselected 
 63         signedbuffer = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray((short)128, 
JCSystem.MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET); 
 64         register(); 
 65     } 
 66  
 67     // Installs applet. installParameters: contains installation parameters ( PIN, ) 
 68     public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) 
 69     { 
 70         new JCpki(bArray, bOffset, bLength); 
 71     } 
 72  
 73  
 74  
 75     // Processes incoming APDUs 
 76     public void process(APDU apdu) 
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 77     { 
 78         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); //gets a pointer to the APDU buffer 
 79  
 80         // check if it is SELECT APDU command 
 81         if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA] == 0 && buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS] == (byte) (0xA4)) 
 82         return; 
 83  
 84         switch (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS]) 
 85         { 
 86              case VERIFY_PIN: 
 87                     verifyPIN(apdu); 
 88                     break; 
 89              case SIGN: 
 90                     signData(apdu); 
 91                     break; 
 92              case UPDATE_PIN: 
 93                     updatePIN(apdu); 
 94                     break; 
 95              case GET_PUBLIC_EXPONENT: 
 96                     sendExponent(apdu); 
 97                     break; 
 98              case GET_PUBLIC_MODULUS: 
 99                     sendModulus(apdu); 
100                         break; 
101              case UPDATE_KEYS: 
102                     updateKeys(apdu); 
103                     break; 
104              default: 
105                     ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
106         } 
107     } 
108  
109     // user authentication via PIN check 
110     private void verifyPIN(APDU apdu) 
111     { 
112         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
113         byte dataLength = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC];//number of bytes in the APDU’s data field  
114         if (dataLength > 8 || dataLength < 1) 
115             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
116         apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); //data is read into apdu buffer 
117  
118         if (appletPIN.check(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLength ) != true) 
119                 ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
120         else 
121         { 
122             apdu.setOutgoing(); 
123             apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
124             apdu.sendBytesLong(SW_NO_ERROR, (short) 0, (short)SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
125         } 
126     } 
127      
128     private void updatePIN(APDU apdu) 
129     { 
130         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
131             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
132         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
133          
134         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
135         byte dataLength = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC];//number of bytes in the APDU’s data field 
136         apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); //data is read into the apdu buffer 
137          
138         if (dataLength > 8 || dataLength < 4) 
139             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
140         appletPIN.update(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLength); 
141         appletPIN.resetAndUnblock(); 
142          
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143         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
144         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
145         apdu.sendBytesLong(SW_NO_ERROR, (short) 0, (short)SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
146         } 
147  
148  
149     private void sendExponent(APDU apdu) 
150     { 
151         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
152             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
153         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
154         try 
155         { 
156             dataLength = rsaPublicKey.getExponent(signedbuffer, (short) 0); 
157         } 
158         catch (CryptoException e) 
159         { 
160             ISOException.throwIt(e.getReason()); 
161             return; 
162         } 
163         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
164         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) dataLength); 
165         apdu.sendBytesLong(signedbuffer, (short) 0, (short) dataLength);                 
166     } 
167      
168      
169     private void sendModulus (APDU apdu) 
170     { 
171         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
172             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
173         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
174         try 
175         { 
176             dataLength = rsaPublicKey.getModulus(signedbuffer, (short)0); 
177         } 
178         catch (CryptoException e) 
179         { 
180             ISOException.throwIt(e.getReason()); 
181             return; 
182         } 
183         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
184         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) dataLength); 
185         apdu.sendBytesLong(signedbuffer, (short) 0, (short) dataLength); 
186     } 
187      
188      
189     private void updateKeys(APDU apdu) 
190     { 
191         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
192             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
193         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
194         try 
195         { 
196             rsaPair.genKeyPair(); 
197             rsaPublicKey = (RSAPublicKey) rsaPair.getPublic(); 
198             rsaPrivateKey = (RSAPrivateKey) rsaPair.getPrivate(); 
199         } 
200         catch (CryptoException e) 
201         { 
202             ISOException.throwIt(e.getReason()); 
203             return; 
204         }       
205         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
206         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
207         apdu.sendBytesLong(SW_NO_ERROR, (short) 0, (short)SW_NO_ERROR.length);           
208     } 
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209  
210      
211     private void signData(APDU apdu) 
212     { 
213         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
214             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
215         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
216  
217         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
218         dataLength = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC]; // number of bytes in the data field of APDU 
219         apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); //data is read into the Apdu buffer 
220         try 
221         { 
222                 signatureLength = mSignature.sign(buffer, (short)ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, 
dataLength, signedbuffer, (short) 0); 
223         } 
224         catch (CryptoException e) 
225         { 
226                 ISOException.throwIt(e.getReason()); 
227                 return; 
228         } 
229         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
230         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) signatureLength); 
231         apdu.sendBytesLong(signedbuffer, (short) 0, signatureLength); 
232     } 
233 }//end class JCpki 
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8. Appendix B: source code for the TOTP scheme 
This section contains UML 2.1 diagrams for the TOTPClient MIDlet and the source 
code for JCtotp applet. The source code of the MIDlet itself is on the enclosed CD. 
Figure 8.1: TOTP sequence diagram  
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8.1 TOTPClient Class diagram 
 The following diagram depicts the Java TOTPClient class diagram. 
Figure 8.1.1: TOTPClient class diagram 
 
8.2 JCtotp applet’s source code 
The following section contains the JCtotp Java Card applet’s source code. 
  1 /* 
  2  * Copyright (c) 2010 NTNU, KTH author Oleksandr Bodriagov. 
  3  
  4  *  JCtotp.java  05/03/2010 
  5  
  6  *  This class provides secure HMAC-based One Time Password generation 
  7  *  based on the shared secret K and the data received from the phone (time value). 
  8  *  Returned value is a 32-bit byte array. 
  9  *  The secret key and the initial PIN are transferred to the applet during applet 
 10  *  loading/installation 
 11  */ 
 12  
 13 package totp; 
 14  
 15 import javacard.framework.APDU; 
 16 import javacard.framework.ISO7816; 
 17 import javacard.framework.ISOException; 
 18 import javacard.framework.Applet; 
 19 import javacard.framework.OwnerPIN; 
 20 import javacard.framework.JCSystem; 
 21 import javacard.framework.Util; 
 22 import javacard.security.MessageDigest; 
 23  
 24 public class JCtotp extends Applet 
 25 { 
 26     final static byte VERIFY_PIN = (byte) 0x20; // INS value for ISO 7816-4 VERIFY 
 27     final static byte UPDATE_PIN = (byte) 0x57; // INS value for update PIN request 
 28     final static byte GENERATE_TOTP = (byte) 0x58; // INS value in the generate-request APDUs 
 29     final static byte [] SW_NO_ERROR = {(byte)0x90,(byte)0x00}; 
 30  
 31     final static byte TryLimit = (byte) 4; 
1 1
Communicates 
with the card 
via ►
+  <<constructor>> TOTPClient ()
+  startApp() : void
+  pauseApp() : void
+  destroyApp (boolean) : void
+  commandAction(Command, Displayable) : void
+  commandAction(Command, Item) : void
+  run() : void
+  <<constructor>> CardCommunicator ()
+  setConnection(APDUConnection) : void
+  generateTOTP(int) : String
+  verifyPIN(String) : boolean
+  updatePIN(String) : boolean
-  makePinApdu(byte, String) : byte[]
-  makeTimeEnvelope() : byte[]
- cardConnection: APDUConnection
~ SW_NO_ERROR: byte ([]) {readOnly}
~ INS_VERIFY_PIN: byte {readOnly}
~ INS_CHANGE_PIN: byte {readOnly}
~ INS_GENERATE_TOTP: byte {readOnly}
CardCommunicator
-  GUI elements: TextFields, Commands, etc.
-  appletAID: String  {readOnly}
~  totpNumberDigits: int = 6 {readOnly}
-  cardConnection: APDUConnection
-  cardCommunicator: CardCommunicator
TOTPClient
MIDlet
CommandListener
ItemCommandListener
Runnable
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 32     final static byte MaxPINSize = (byte) 8; 
 33     final static byte secKeyLength = (byte) 32;//in bytes 
 34     private OwnerPIN appletPIN; 
 35     private byte [] secretKey; 
 36      
 37     final static byte blockLength = 64;//block lengths in HMAC-SHA1 
 38     private byte [] workbuffer; // buffer for HMAC-SHA method 
 39     private short offset;// offset value from which HOTP truncation is started 
 40     private byte[] hotp; //array for storing the final HOTP value      
 41     private MessageDigest shaDigest; 
 42        
 43     // Constructor. initializes secret key & PIN variables, and data buffers 
 44     protected JCtotp(byte[] installParameters, short offset, byte length) 
 45     { 
 46         byte [] initialPIN = new byte[4]; 
 47         short pinOffset = offset;       
 48         secretKey = new byte[secKeyLength];         
 49  
 50         Util.arrayCopy(installParameters, (short)(pinOffset), initialPIN,(short)0 , (short)4); 
 51         Util.arrayCopy(installParameters, (short)(pinOffset + 4), secretKey, (short)0, 
secKeyLength); 
 52  
 53         appletPIN = new OwnerPIN(TryLimit, MaxPINSize); 
 54         appletPIN.update(initialPIN, (short) 0,(byte) 4); 
 55  
 56         shaDigest = MessageDigest.getInstance(MessageDigest.ALG_SHA,false); 
 57         hotp = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray((short)20, 
JCSystem.MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET); 
 58         workbuffer = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray((short)(blockLength + 
MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA), 
 59                                                       JCSystem.MEMORY_TYPE_TRANSIENT_RESET); 
 60  
 61         register(); 
 62     } 
 63  
 64     // Installs applet. installParameters: contains installation parameters (PIN ,secret key, ) 
 65     public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) 
 66     { 
 67         new JCtotp(bArray, bOffset, bLength); 
 68     } 
 69  
 70     // Processes incoming APDUs 
 71     public void process(APDU apdu) 
 72     { 
 73         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); //gets a pointer to the APDU buffer 
 74  
 75             // check if it is SELECT APDU command 
 76         if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA] == 0 && buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS] == (byte)(0xA4)) 
 77             return; 
 78  
 79         switch (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS]) 
 80         { 
 81              case VERIFY_PIN: 
 82                     verifyPIN(apdu); 
 83                     break; 
 84              case GENERATE_TOTP: 
 85                     generateTOTP(apdu); 
 86                     break; 
 87              case UPDATE_PIN: 
 88                     updatePIN(apdu); 
 89                     break; 
 90              default: 
 91                     ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); 
 92         } 
 93     } 
 94  
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 95     // user authentication via PIN check 
 96     private void verifyPIN(APDU apdu) 
 97     { 
 98         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
 99         byte dataLength = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC];// number of bytes in the APDU’s data field 
100         if (dataLength > 8 || dataLength < 1) 
101             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
102         apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); //data is read into apdu buffer 
103  
104         if (appletPIN.check(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLength ) != true) 
105                 ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
106         else 
107         { 
108             apdu.setOutgoing(); 
109             apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
110             apdu.sendBytesLong(SW_NO_ERROR, (short) 0, (short)SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
111         } 
112     } 
113          
114     private void updatePIN(APDU apdu) 
115     { 
116         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
117             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
118         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
119          
120         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
121         byte dataLength = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC];//number of bytes in the APDU’s data field 
122         apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); //data is read into apdu buffer 
123          
124         if (dataLength > 8 || dataLength < 4) 
125             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
126         appletPIN.update(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, dataLength); 
127         appletPIN.resetAndUnblock(); 
128          
129         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
130         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
131         apdu.sendBytesLong(SW_NO_ERROR, (short) 0, (short)SW_NO_ERROR.length); 
132     } 
133  
134     private void generateTOTP(APDU apdu) 
135     { 
136         if(appletPIN.isValidated() != true) 
137             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
138         appletPIN.reset();//resets the validated flag and resets the PIN try counter to the value 
139  
140         byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); 
141         byte dataLength = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC]; 
142         if (dataLength > 8) 
143             ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
144         apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); //data is read into apdu buffer 
145  
146      limitedHmacSha(hotp, secretKey, buffer, short)ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA,(short)dataLength); 
147  
148         // Dynamic truncation according to RFC 4226 
149         offset = (short)(hotp[MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA - 1] & 0xf); //take only 4 low-order bits 
150  
151         apdu.setOutgoing(); 
152         apdu.setOutgoingLength((short) 4); 
153         apdu.sendBytesLong(hotp, (short) offset, (short) 4); 
154     } 
155  
156     //calculates HMAC-SHA1 according to RFC 2104 for data blocks <= 20 bytes 
157     private void limitedHmacSha (byte [] mac, byte [] key,  byte [] data, short dOffset,         
short datalength) 
158     { 
159         byte i = 0; 
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160         for (i = 0; i < blockLength; i++) 
161            workbuffer[i] = (byte)0x00; 
162  
163         //hash the key if it is longer than 64 bytes and write result to workbuffer 
164         if (key.length > blockLength) 
165            shaDigest.doFinal(key, (short) 0, (short)key.length, workbuffer, (short) 0); 
166         else 
167            for (i = 0; i < key.length; i++) 
168            workbuffer[i] = key[i]; 
169  
170         //K XOR ipad 
171         for (i = 0; i < blockLength; i++) 
172             workbuffer [i] ^= (byte) 0x36; 
173  
174         //append the stream of data 'text' to the (K XOR ipad) 
175         for (i = 0; i < datalength; i++) 
176             workbuffer[(short)(blockLength + i)] = data [(short)(dOffset + i)]; 
177  
178          //creates H(K XOR ipad, text) and appends to the buffer after the space for (K XOR opad) 
179         shaDigest.doFinal(workbuffer, (short) 0, (short)(blockLength + datalength), workbuffer, 
(short) blockLength); 
180  
181         //calculates (K XOR opad) and puts it in the buffer before H(K XOR ipad, text) 
182         for (i = 0; i < blockLength; i++) 
183         { 
184             workbuffer [i] ^= (byte) 0x36;//take away previous XOR 
185             workbuffer [i] ^= 0x5C; 
186         } 
187         // calculates H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text)) and writes it to mac 
188         shaDigest.doFinal (workbuffer, (short) 0, (short) (blockLength + 
MessageDigest.LENGTH_SHA), mac, (short) 0); 
189     } 
190 }//end class JCtotp 
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9. Appendix C: digital attachments 
The attached ZIP archive contains the following directories and files: 
 
 Bluetooth smart card reader architecture: 
 Bluetooth smart card reader driver 
 driver built for Windows7_x86 
 source 
  driver installation instructions.pdf 
 driver installation instructions.txt 
 L2CAPClient 
 dist 
 source 
 JCpki 
 source 
 jcpki.script 
 simulation instructions for JCDK 3.02.txt 
 TOTP  architecture:   
 TOTPClient 
 dist 
 source 
 JCtotp 
 source 
 jctotp.script 
  simulation instructions for JCDK 3.02.txt 
 Master’s thesis in pdf format 
 
